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Подлинная «китайская версия» истории Тибета: с древних времен Тибет никогда не был частью Китая

control, but some members of the Qing ruling class wanted to capture Tibet by emulating how Britain captured India.

Source: Submissions on Tibetan Affairs in the Qing Era, Book 2. Submissions from Zhang YinTang ,, <Telegram to the Foreign Ministry on a Preliminary Proposal to Rule Tibet >, GuangXu Year 33, Month 1, Day 13 (1907.2.25), p. 1328–1330.

… [We] must capture [Tibet’s] governmental control as soon as possible… To capture governmental control, we must grasp the current window of opportunity during which Dalai has yet to return, deploy a hundred or so armyacademy graduates, surreptitiously arranged, in order to be efficient and effective. … The Tibetan region covers 7000 Li [Chinese miles] in both directions, its mineral deposits are unrivaled throughout the five continents. In future it will definitely be our excellent colony . If managed by the right people, the benefits will double in 10 years, our annual commercial profit will exceed tens of millions!

Source: Submissions on Tibetan Affairs in the Qing Era, Book 2. Submissions from Zhang YinTang, <Submission on the Tibet Situation and Handling the Aftermaths>, GuangXu Year 33, Month 11 (1907.12), p. 1395–1402.

… Submission on the Tibet situation and actions for handling the aftermaths, respectfully praying for Your Holy

[Majestic] Attention:

…Tibet is vast but sparsely populated, rich in minerals, in future it could be exploited as a colony. …The Amban in Tibet has never taken care of [governmental] affairs, and has long been despised by the Tibetans. He has no military support to suppress/appease,

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and is unable to participate in any government matters. The British ridicule us for having no sovereignty in Tibet and for our failure to fulfill the obligations of a ‘master nation;’ we indeed should feel ashamed. …

As for the likelihood that Tibetan authorities will resist if we take over their government…, this official humbly feels that the Tibetans are poor, weak and stupid; at present they have no ability to resist. …Even if there were minor disturbances, 3000 trained soldiers will be enough to suppress/placate them. … The way China governs Tibet must be like the way Britain governs India…

§ 8. Instead of Defending Tibet, the Qing Regime Supported the British Invasion Force in 1904

Background: The British invaded Tibet the second time in 1904; they admit that the battle they had in Guru (inside Tibet) was a ‘massacre’ of the Tibetans. Extracts 10 and 11 from typical post-1949 PRC publications give the impression that China was on the Tibetans’ side. In contrast, Extract 12 is from an official letter sent by the then Qing Amban (named YouTai) to the British commander Younghusband who led the massacre; the letter clearly shows that the Qing regime explicitly supported the British invasion and applauded the massacre.

Extract 10.

Source: College of Military Sciences ed. (1985), History of Modern Chinese Wars, Vol 2 , Military Science Press, pg. 323.

There were more than 1400 casualties in the Guru Battle, but nobody surrendered. This fully demonstrates the heroic spirit of the Chinese people, who are not afraid of aggressors and would rather die than bow to bullies.

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Extract 11.

Source: Hu Yan (2004), The Snowy Highland will Never Forget: A History of Britain’s Invasion of Tibet in 19041904 , China Tibetology Publisher, p. 53.

The beastly actions of the enemies are so angering that they make our hair stand straight up. 1904.3.31 is a day the Tibetans will never forget. In history, this is the day British imperialism created the heaviest debt-of-blood against the Tibetan people.

Extract 12.

Source: Wu FengPei ed. (1937), Official Correspondence between Tibet and India , ‘Series on Qing-Era Tibet Historical Material ’ Vol. 1, published by ‘National Beijing Academy of Research, Institute of History Research • ,’ p. 59.

Amban YouTai to Younghusband: … GuangXu Year 30 [1904], Month 3, Day 3.

‘I have noted the various aspects stated in the letter from Your Excellency. The Tibetan military commander did not obey my prohibitions, and shockingly dared to initiate troubles and resort to violence in Guru. The glorious might of your great nation defeated their horde . Although they deserve the sufferings because they were at fault, this great officer [i. e., ‘I’] must admit that it is also because I failed in ‘guiding ’ them…

Fortunately, Your Excellency took pity on their roguery and ignorance and forgave their past errors. You have released all the captured soldiers, and have also ordered that the wounded be medically treated.

You are truly benevolent! You apply both compassion and might wisely, and bring boundless blessedness and well-being to Tibet

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This great officer

[i. e., ‘I’] can only plan to lead the [Tibetan] Fan-barbarian people to place flowers and incense on an altar and send you our thankful prayers from afar .

§ 9. Conclusion

This paper presented only a small portion of the documentary evidence provided in my book. This evidence shows that Tibet was not part of China during the Ming and Qing dynasties.

Clarification: I now live in California, USA, not in Hong Kong. If I were living in Hong Kong now, I would not have dared to make this presentation.

References

1. Anonymous. ~1750. Tibet Record . Republished in 1982 by Lhasa: Tibet People’s Press, 1982.

2. Great Qing Comprehensive Reference – GuangXu •. 1899. Republished in 2002 by Shanghai Classics Publishers in ‘Sequel to the Four Libraries ’ edition, History Section – Administration Category, Vol. 794.

3. Great Qing Comprehensive References, 5 Reigns. Republished in 2006 by Beijing: Thread-Binding Books Publishing House.

4.Great Qing Unification Record – JiaQing, • . ~1842. Republished in 2008 by Shanghai Classics Publishers in ‘Sequel to the Four Libraries’ edition, History Section – Geography Category, Vol. 613–614. Also digitized edition, Basic Classicsdatabase.

5.Hu Yan . 2004. The Snowy Highland will Never Forget: A History of Britain’s Invasion of Tibet in 1904

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1904 . Beijing: China Tibetology

Publisher.

6.Huang FenSheng . 1985. History of the Tibetan People . Beijing: Ethnic Press .

7.Li Xian (ed.). ~1461. Imperially Commissioned Great Ming Unification Record . Government of the Ming Empire, TianShun (1461) edition.

8.Shen DeFu . ~1606. Unofficial Notes from WanLi Era

. Republished by Beijing: China Press , 1959.

9.Tan QiXiang (ed.). 1982. The Historical Atlas of China , in 8 volumes (commissioned by PRC’s Academy of Social Sciences). Beijing: China Cartographic Publishing House.

10.Wang, ZiYin . 1805, 1877. Contemporary and Historical Geography . 1877. Republished in 1997 by Beijing Press in ‘Works Excluded in the SiKuQuanShu’ edition, Part 4 Book 18. Also a photocopy of a Qingera thread-bound edition of the entire book can be downloaded from CADAL free of charge.

11.Wei Yuan . 1845. Record of Holy Conquests . Republished in 1984 by Beijing: China Press.

12.<White Paper 1992: Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation>. Information Office of PRC’s State Council; www.china.org.cn/e-white/tibet/index.htm.

13.Wu FengPei (ed.). 1937. Official Correspondence between Tibet and India , ‘Series on Qing-Era Tibet Historical Material ’ Vol. 1. Beijing: National Beijing Academy of Research, Institute of History Research• ; distributed by the Commercial Press.

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DOI: 10.31696/2587-9502-2021-31-134-155

Мандала государства: взгляд из Лхасы

А. Мак-Кей

International Institute for Asian Studies, Netherlands.

Аннотация. Вданнойстатьеобсуждаетсяобоснованностьобщегоразвертыванияконцепциимандалыдляпредставленияполитическойформулировки «традиционного» тибетского государства и его соседей с тибетскойкультурой: Сиккима, Бутана, Монголииит. д. Доказывается, что это справедливо только с точки зренияЛхасы, ориентированной на школу Гэлуг. Эта точка зрения оспаривается альтернативными территориальнымиформулировками, такимикак«Скрытыеземли» школы Ньингма.

Ключевые слова: развертывание, мандала, Тибетское государство, Сикким, Бутан, Лхаса, «Скрытыеземли», Ньингма.

The Mandala of State: looking out from Lhasa

Alex McKay

Abstract. This paper discusses the validity of the common deployment of the concept of the mandala to represent the political formulation of the ‘traditional’ Tibetan state and its culturally Tibetan neighbours: Sikkim, Bhutan, Mongolia and so on. It argues that this is valid only from the Lhasacentric perspective of the Gelugpa sect. That perspective is implicitly, if not explicitly contested by alternative territorial formulations such as that of the ‘Hidden Lands’ of the Nyingmapa sect.

Key Words: deployment, mandala, Tibetan State, Sikkim, Bhutan, Lhasacentric perspective, Hidden Lands, Nyingmapa sect.

The history of Sino-Tibetan relations has been discussed by many scholars and political commentators. Those relations have of

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course, varied in nature over more than a millennium. But during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), they were understood by the Tibetan Buddhist state in terms of a ‘Patron–Priest’ (yon mchod) spiritual relationship between the Manchu Emperor as patron/donor, and the Tibetan religious hierarch as spiritual counsellor and officiant1.

The theoretical basis of Tibet’s relations with other neighbouring states has not, however, been examined in comparable depth. I would like, therefore, to address that issue in what follows, and in particular to explore the validity of using the maṇḍala as a culturally appropriate framework for understanding these relationships. While noting earlier developments, my primary concern is with the situation under the Ganden Phodrang (dga’ ldan pho brang) Lhasa government – that regime which emerged fully under the 5th Dalai Lama in the mid-17th Century and was ended by the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. Under that Ganden Phodrang government, the predominant state authorities and monastic institutions were followers of what became the leading Tibetan Buddhist sect, the Gelugpa (dge lugs pa), who looked to Tsong Khapa (c. 1357–1419) as their lineage founder.

Now I am not suggesting that this maṇḍala framework emerges from, or has been specifically articulated in some previously unrevealed Tibetan text. Rather it is intended as an analytical device reflecting Tibetan Buddhist world-views as we know them both from their historical actions and their textual and artistic traditions, and it has been deployed by a number of scholars as a means to understand social and historical processes in specific regions within and around Tibet2.

In general terms the pre-Nation state era in Asia was one in which political units took their place within power hierarchies that were understood and acknowledged but not necessarily applied

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or enforced. This political system enabled small polities to retain local autonomy in return for ritualised acknowledgement that they were subject to the overlordship of larger units, and thus under their protection3. That acknowledgement took various forms, commonly involving some form of tribute to the higher power, and the provision of armed forces when necessary for the defense of the higher realm. A classic example of this type of relationship was the autonomous state of Sikkim. Prior to the British take-over in the late 19th Century it acknowledged the suzerainty of Tibet, but also acknowledged that the Qing Empire was the suzerain power in Tibet. Yet neither Tibet nor China stationed troops or secular officials at the Sikkimese court or were directly involved in day-to-day affairs there.

The Mandala

The earliest reference to the term mandala is in the earliest Indic text, the Ṛgveda, dating to around 1200–900 BCE. There the term indicates a ‘book’ or ‘chapter’ and is thus used as an organising principle. By the time of the Arthaśāstra, around 150 CE., the term was applied to the wider organising principle of a political or administrative unit5.

Conceptually, the mandala derived from the Vedic sacrifices on ground ritually demarcated to exclude the impure and the profane6. Vedic concepts of the pure, multi-dimensional centre, the axis mundi and the font of worldly and other-worldly power, were fundamental to the mandala’s development. Thus the Arthaśāstra situates the ideal royal palace at the centre of a kingdom7, corresponding on an earthly level to the heavenly palace of the presiding deity of that kingdom. In both cases, the power and the purity of the centre was envisaged as radiating

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outwards, and like the light of a torch in the darkness, weakening as the distance from the centre grew.

The mandala is implicitly multi-dimensional, spanning the realms of existence. In its classical form it was envisioned, and artistically represented, with the presiding central figure surrounded by four – or sometimes eight – lesser related entities. Each of these surrounding figures might also be located at the centre of their own mandala. Thus a mandala in which the central figure was the tutelary deity of the Kargyu (’bka brgyud) sect, Demchog (bde mchog: the Sanskrit Cakrasaṃvara), might feature the iconic Kargyupa lineage-holder Milarepa as one of the surrounding figures. He in turn might be depicted at the centre of his own mandala with disciples such as Gampopa (sgam po pa) taking their place among the surrounding figures. Still another mandala might feature Gampopa as the central figure surrounded by his disciples, and so on.

Thus while the concept of the centre as the source of sacred power was fundamental to the mandala, there was an underlying structural unity deriving from the conception of its outer elements as emanations or projections of that centre8. As a political model the mandala retains that hierarchical multi-dimensional form and structural unity. Thus the Tibetan state might be peripheral in a China-centred political mandala, but central in a mandala in which Sikkim was peripheral.

The disparate elements of the mandala were synthesised into its fully developed form within Tantric Buddhism around the mid-first millennium of the Christian era9. Its cultural validity was such that, as Toni Huber states,

[in] various forms and applications throughout Asia, mandala have served as archetypes of the ideal city, models of the cosmos, blueprints for centers of royal power, templates for the operation of

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polities, networks for the distribution of resources, plans for sacred architecture, representations of the divine mansion or palace and schemes for the distribution of vital energies within the human body10.

As a blueprint for centres of royal power and template for the operation of political formulations, the mandala provides a theoretical framework for the foreign relations of the Ganden Phodrang state, represented as a religio-political mandala in which the Dalai Lama, as the highest incarnation of the Gelugpa sect and the earthly emanation of Tibet’s protective deity the Boddhisattva Chenrezig/Avalokiteśvara, was situated at the centre of the realm in his Potala Palace. His – and thus both the Gelugpa’s and Tibet’s – power radiated out from the Potala to the peripheral realms of the Tibetan mandala of state.

That model represents the world-view of the Gelugpa, although there were alternative conceptions implicitly contesting that view, as we will see. But that world-view is something that many scholars, drawing on Stanley Tambiah’s insights from southeast Asian Buddhist polities11, have deployed in various related contexts, not least the political. As Geoffrey Samuel observed, «the fully-fledged Tantric maṇḍala is a model of a specific kind of state, what Stanley Tambiah has called a galactic polity»12.

Tambiah’s model stresses «the principle of replication of the center on a progressively reduced scale by the satellites that were the major characteristic of the polity’s territorial arrangement»13. Thus the principal aspects of the centre – social organisation, ritual calendars of state, administrative, architectural or military practices, and so on – were replicated in the structures of the peripheral realms14. This is at least broadly consistent with the general tendencies of the Ganden Phodrang government, as it is with the monastic structures of the Gelugpa sect across the Tibetan plateau.

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