книги / Местное самоуправление в современном обществе
..pdfof 914 cities (dimos) and 120 municipalities (koinotita; cf. Dexia 2008, Hlepas 2003, 2010, Getimis/Hlepas 2010). In the meantime, an even further-reaching territorial reform is on the political agenda and this may receive further impetus by the reform pressure from the country’s current financial crisis.
Bulgaria, Lithuania: on the northern european path
Among the transformation countries, Bulgaria is an example of territorial up-scaling of the “Northern European” type. As early as in 1991, a territorial reform was decided on and implemented, one that resulted in the creation of 264 municipalities with an average of 29.090 inhabitants (cf. Dexia 2008). In 1994, Lithuania followed suit by cutting the number of 581 municipalities to 56 with an average population of 55.000 inhabitants (cf. Beksta/Petkevicius 2000, Dexia 2008). Alongside England and Denmark, this is the highest population average among European countries. In the meantime, however, a political debate emerged in Lithuania, in which the municipalities that resulted from the 1994 reform have been criticized for being “over-sized” and therefore a corresponding “reform of the reform” has been called for (cf. Dexia 2008).
3. Southern European Reform-Model:
Inter-Municipal Cooperation and Trans-Scaling
3.1. France: “Inter-municipal revolution” as a pragmatic path towards territorial consolidation
Due to the huge degree of small-size fragmentation of its local territorial structure and to its remarkable historical continuity, France is the “classical” example of the Southern European territorial pattern (cf. Norton 1994). The territorial structure of the 37.000 municipalities (communes), with an average of 1.600 inhabitants, dates to the French Revolution of 1789 and historically extends even further back because it is largely rooted in parish communities. This territorial setting has remained essentially unchanged to the present day. In 1971, parallel to the “North European” reform initiatives, the French government undertook
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the legislative attempt (Loi Marcellin) to overcome the historically fragmented, territorial structure of the municipalities by amalgamating them. However, this reform attempt completely failed as the reform legislation, premised on the “voluntary” principle (volontariat) made the realization of territorial reform dependent on the consent of the affected municipality and its population; such “voluntary” consent could, however, hardly be achieved under this circumstance.
In view of the path-dependent, persistent, territorial fragmentation of the municipalities, France proceeded, in a sequence of developmental stages, to establish a multi-layered and complex institutional system of inter-municipal cooperative bodies (called Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale, EPCI) which has become a typical feature of France’s subnational institutional world (Intercommunalité; Kuhlmann 2010). On the basis of national legislation of 1890 and 1959, the municipalities at first institutionalized their cooperation in the form of singleand/or multi-functional bodies (syndicats à vocation unique and syndicatsà vocation multiple). Subsequently, in 1966, a new institutional form of inter-municipal cooperation, the so-called urban associations (communautés urbaines CU), was introduced by legislation. This form was marked in particular by providing the associations with taxation rights of their own (à fiscalité propre), thus strengthening their institutional, functional and budgetary integration, while still retaining their member municipalities (cf. Marcou 2000). Under binding legislation (par la loi), a rare exception of the voluntary principle, urban associations (communautés urbaines) were created in the four metropolitan areas of Marseilles, Lyon, Lille and Strasbourg; subsequently another ten and more recently (in 2008) another two communautés urbaines were (voluntarily) established. Meanwhile, these 16 urban associations have risen to become functionally and financially integrated local government units in France’s most important urban/metropolitan areas. Although the member municipalities have preserved their political autonomy, this development can still be seen as marking France’s “pragmatic route towards achieving territorial reform despite the failure of amalgamations” (Marcou 2010).
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Inter-municipal revolution
Another major legislative and institutional-political step was taken in 1999 by the adoption of a law (Loi Chevènement), which has been regarded by some as ushering in a “true inter-municipal revolution” (veritable révolution intercommunale; Borraz/LeGalès 2005, cf. Kerrouche 2010, see also Kuhlmann 2010c). This law was designed to simplify the “mushrooming” of the intercommunalité by laying down in statute three types of inter-municipal formations (differentiated by size and settlement structure and endowed with a taxing power of their own (à fiscalité propre) according to which the municipalities should be grouped in the future. As a result of this process, which was promoted by financial incentives along with gentle pressure from the prefects, by 2011, 191 agglomeration associations (communautés d’agglomération – CA) and 2,387 associations of local authorities (communautés de communes – CC) were established. The total number amounts to 2,599 inter-municipal formations (EPCI’s) with taxing power. Sixtynine percent of all municipalities are clustered under one of these three types of association.
Reform proposals under Sarkozy
Notwithstanding the remarkable institutional consolidation of the intercommunalité , its continuing weakness is seen for one in the fact that it further complicates, rather than facilitates, the subnational network of action . Secondly, the lack of a direct election of the deci- sion-making bodies of the communautés has been criticized as a serious political and democratic deficit (cf. Wollmann 2008; Kuhlmann 2009a). The debate surrounding an extensive reform of the subnational institutional system received fresh impetus when President Sarkozy, in October 2008, appointed a high-ranking commission that was chaired by ex-Minister President Balladur and named after him (Comité Balladur). In submitting its reform recommendations in March 2009 (cf. Comité Balladur 2009), the Commission proclaimed the ambitious, strategic goal that “the inter-municipal bodies would be transformed into fully responsible municipalities,
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enabling France to possess a reasonable number of strong municipalities”. Accordingly, the Comité proposed a whole range of reform steps (for details, cf. Némery 2010; Wollmann 2010b; Marcou 2010; Kuhlmann 2010c).
Establishment of métropoles
Following a long and controversial legislative process, a Reform Act (Loi de réforme des collectivités territoriales) was passed on 16 December 2010, envisaging far-reaching changes in France’s subnational institutional system. Inter alia, the members of the representative bodies (conseillers communautaires) of the individual intermunicipal formations (communautés de commmunes, d’agglomération, urbaines, métropoles) from 2014 on shall be directly elected in member municipalities that have more than 3.500 inhabitants. However, the member-municipalities with fewer than 3.500 inhabitants (and this is the majority) will retain the existing electoral procedure of indirect election by the municipalities’ councils (conseils). This “split” electoral procedure reflects the political conflicts and compromises on which the legislation was based. Furthermore, taking up the recommendations of the Comité Balladur, the establishment of so-called métropoles is stipulated. In the Reform Act, the eight communautés urbaines (CU), established by legislation in 1966, shall provide the territorial basis of the métropoles which comprise the most densely populated large cities with surrounding municipalities (Lyon, Lille, Marseille, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Strasbourg, etc.). In addition, another four inter-municipal formations (communautés d’agglomérations) with more than 500.000 inhabitants were identified as métropoles. As a result, practically all metropolitan areas in France shall be organized as métropoles. The métropoles shall not be established as new autonomous territorial bodies, as proposed by the Comité Balladur, but rather as a constellation of member cities and municipalities following the traditional logic of the intercommunalité. However, further institutional and functional integration shall be achieved by assigning them important tasks of their (formally continuing to exist) member-municipalities as well as func-
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tions of their respective département and région. The inclusion and transfer of departmental and regional functions thus makes for a remarkable innovation. The new model of métropoles would embody an organizational logic similar to the German county-free cities (kreisfreie Städte) and the English unitary authorities. The new design of the métropoles would amount to the functional and vertical integration of even three levels (communes, département, région). Finally, the Reform Act provides for a simplified procedure for the amalgamation of municipalities to create “new municipalities” (communes nouvelles). On this, however, the voluntary principle (volontariat) is retained (under which, it should be recalled, the legislative attempt of 1971 to instigate territorial reforms was largely doomed to failure). By and large, the Reform Act of December 2010 can be interpreted as still another significant step forward, as Marcou claims (see further above), in being a reasonable way of establishing local territorial reform, even though there has not been much success in previous attempts at establishing municipal mergers (2010).
While the Reform Act of 2010 stipulated that the key provisions of the reform come into effect by 2014/2015, in the meantime the fate of the reform project that bears the handwriting of the last period of the Sarzoky presidency and of his conservative parliamentary majority seems uncertain. France’s new (socialist) President François Hollande who was elected in May 2012 and the new (socialist) parliamentary majority appear to be set to rewrite the agenda and legislation on the France’s subnational institutional structure and to undo, at least in part, the legislation shaped by his predecessor’s government and majority.
3.2.Italy, Spain: growing fragmentation and increasing reform pressure
Italy’s reform pattern also corresponds to the Southern European type. As such, legislation passed in 1990 was geared towards bringing about voluntary territorial reform of the 8.100 municipalities (comuni), with an average population of 7.400 , as well as the 110 provinces (province), with an average population of 550.000. The results, howev-
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er, were “laughable, as the number of municipalities did not decrease and that of the provinces even increased” (Bobbio 2005). In light of this, the legislation passed in 1990 and 2000 was targeted at encouraging the local governments to establish inter-municipal formations for cooperation in several institutional variants (cf. Dexia 2008). Firstly, there was the founding of theunioni di comuni (comparable to the institutional form of French intercommunalitéand also German joint administrations/Ämter). Their number increased from 50 to 278 between 2000 and 2008 and includes 1.240 (or almost 20 percent of) municipalities with a total of 3.9 million inhabitants. Furthermore, the establishment of Comunità Montana for the (expansive) mountain areas was made statutory, which now include 4.201 (or half of the) municipalities with a total of 10.8 million inhabitants. Moreover, the municipalities entered into a number of cooperation agreements (consorzi).
Furthermore, a new law (Legge Galli) came into effect in 1994, under which the territorial and institutional fragmentation of water supply was to be overcome. On this basis, so-called “agencies with optimal territorial scope” (= autorità di ambiti territoriali ottimali – ATO) were created in the regional vicinity of the individual province as a variant of obligatory inter-municipal cooperation (Citroni 2010). In the meantime, 91 such agencies have been created in the water sector and in 2006, the ATO scheme was expanded to include waste removal (cf. Ianello 2007, Lippi et al. 2008; Dreyfus et al. 2010).
The euro crisis and pressure on the part of the EU have prompted the previous Italian “technocrat” interim government under Mario Monti, as well as the current “grand coalition” (larga intesa) under Enrico Letta to push for local level territorial reforms. The Monti government set upon a strategy (revealingly with the Anglo-Saxon label “spending review”) which aimed at cutting the costs of the existing political and administrative structures. In November 2012, a couple of (governmental) decrees were adopted which, for one, abolished the elected councils of the province. Thus, the introduction of self-government at the provincial level was to be reversed. Second, the number of province (with regard to the remaining
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deconcentrated state functions) was to be reduced from 86 to 51. Third, those province in which the 10 largest cities (Roma, Torino, Milano, Venezia, Genova, Bologna, Firenze, Bari, Napoli and Reggio Calabria) are located were to be amalgamated, by binding legal provisions, with these cities to form a città metropolitana. However, whilst the respective province were to be integrated in the città metropolitana, their (small scale) member municipalitieswere still to be retained. These new città metropolitana-type local government units were, as a rule, to be represented by the mayors of the member cities, whereby the metropolitan mayorswould generally be those of the affected large city. In their institutional structure, the Italian città metropolitana are reminiscent of France’s communauté urbaine.
On 4 July 2013 the Constitutional Court, which got involved in the matter by the complaints of some province, declared the governmental “decrees” to be unconstitutional as such radical change in the province (as constitutionally entrenched entities) would require constitutional legislation. In an immediate response to the court ruling the Council of Ministers, on 5 July 2013, approved a pertinent constitutional draft law, which manifested Prime Minister Letta’s and his government’s determination to put the radical political, institutional and functional transformation and reduction of the existing province into effect as soon as possible.
3.3. Spain: regions fearful of strong municipalities
In line with the Southern European pattern of territorial organization, Spain has also experienced the emergence of inter-municipal formations for the operative support of municipalities. Besides the consequential introduction of the regions (comunidades autónomas) as a “quasi-federal” subnational level, following the end of the Franco dictatorship and the foundation of a democratic and constitutional state in 1978, the reconstruction of local self-government took place initially under the traditional two-tier local government structure (cf. Alba/Navarro 2003). On the lower tier, the 8.111 municipalities (municipios) having an average population of 5.430 and two-thirds
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of which have less than 1.000 inhabitants, have a Southern Europeanterritorial profile. The upper level comprises the 50 provincias, whose representative bodies (diputación provincial) are not elected directly, but rather indirectly by the municipal councils (cf. Dexia 2008). To date, the regions, which decide on the territorial structure of the municipalities, have not only refrained from territorial reform, but since 1980 have even increased the number of municipalities. The creation or acceptance of local authorities that would be strengthened by territorial consolidation is obviously not in the interest of the regions wary of their influence (cf. Alba/Navarro 2003). Instead, in part monoand in part multi-functional inter-municipal formations (Mancomunidades) have been set up (currently about 1.000), into which around 75 percent of all municipalities are grouped (cf. Dexia 2008). Furthermore, four of the regions (currently 81) have installed Comarcas that are responsible for the inter-municipal implementation of tasks transferred to them by the regions.
3.4. Transformation countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic
Hungary: territorial refragmentation
Among the group of Central and Eastern European transformation countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic exemplify the Southern European territorial pattern. In Hungary, the local government legislation adopted in 1990 granted extensive autonomy to the lower local level by establishing local government units (“settlements”). The local populations quickly activated this right to reverse the territorial amalgamation of the local level which had been enforced under the communist regime (cf. Temesi 2000; Soós 2003; Wollmann/Lankina 2003). As a result, the number of municipalities in the wake of the regime change jumped in a short space of time from 1.584 to 3.175 local government units with an average population of 3.170 of which almost a third had fewer than 500 inhabitants. While the local government system was significantly strengthened both functionally and politically by subsequent reforms, in particular that of 1994, the territorial structure of the two levels remained
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unchanged. In reaction to the existence and continuation of the multitude of small and very small municipalities, different forms of intermunicipal cooperation were legislatively encouraged and put into place thereby falling in line with the Southern European pattern. This holds true firstly for a law passed in 1997, which was intended to boost the mono-functional inter-municipal cooperation. To date, around 2.590 such forms of cooperation have come into existence (cf. Dexia 2008). Secondly, a law passed in 2003 targeted the institutionalization of the multi-functional cooperation between municipalities (cf. Pfeil 2010). The government has now initiated the establishment of 162 such multi-functional inter-municipal formations, into which 97.5 percent of all municipalities are grouped (cf. Pfeil 2010).
Czech Republic: forgoing necessary reform
The Czech Republic is another distinct example of territorial fragmentation on the local government level (cf. Illner 2003, 2010; Dexia 2008). Due to the spontaneous formation of municipalities following the system change of 1990, the number of municipalities rose from 4.120 to 6.196 local government units (cf. Illner 2010) numbering an average of 1.640 inhabitants, two-thirds of which have fewer than 500 inhabitants (cf. Illner 2010). Although the need for local government territorial reform has long been a subject of political debates, the government has thus far failed to undertake any serious reform initiatives (cf. Dexia 2008). The establishment of inter-municipal forms of cooperation in the Czech Republic is also aimed at providing operative support to the smallest municipalities, whose size impedes any real efficiency. To date, 474 such inter-municipal bodies have been created, to which 4.680 (or 70 percent) municipalities belong (cf. Illner 2010).
4. Reform Hybrid: Germany between Territorial Amalgamation and Inter-Municipal Cooperation
The reform strategies pursued in Germany can be assigned in part to the “Northern European” model and in part to the Southern Europeanone. The reason for this lies in the constitutionally en-
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trenched power of each of the Länder to decide its “own” territorial reform policy which reflects the different settlement structures and varying party political constellations. In procedural terms, the Länder governments prepared the elaboration and implementation of their respective reform concepts by appointing reform commissions, by public hearings and by a so-called voluntary phase. During this phase, the municipalities affected were given the opportunity to “voluntarily” adjust themselves to the envisaged territorial changes. If an agreement on the part of the municipalities could not be reached, the Land parliament – in line with the “Northern European” reform model – decided by means of statutory law. A radical reform variant can be found in the strongly urbanized Länder of North-Rhine Westphalia and Hesse, which, at the time, were governed by the Social Democrats. This reform variant was targeted at creating so called “integrated” municipalities (Einheitsgemeinden) through the comprehensive amalgamation of municipalities. In both Länder, the number of municipalities was drastically reduced by over 80 percent. In North-Rhine Westphalia, this resulted in the formation of municipalities with an average of 46,000 inhabitants (cf. Laux 1999).
By contrast, a somewhat Southern European reform variant was embarked upon in the (more rural) Länder of Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein, by largely forgoing the amalgamation of the existing small municipalities and by, instead, introducing intermunicipal formations (comparable to the French intercommunalité) for the operative support and coordination of the municipalities concerned. Hereby, one can distinguish between two variants of intermunicipal formations. Firstly, there are the inter-municipal unions (so-called Ämter or Verwaltungsgemeinschaften), such as in Schles- wig-Holstein where the directing boards of the inter-municipal formation are appointed indirectly by the member municipalities. Secondly, there is the example of Rhineland-Palatinate which “invented” the institutional innovation of the Verbandsgemeinde, a kind of “double-decker municipality”. In this, the previously existing munic-
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