- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Acknowledgments
- •Table of cases
- •Table of statutes
- •Table of statutory instruments
- •Table of treaties
- •Table of EC legislation
- •1 Property law: the issues
- •1.1. Basic definition
- •1.2. Illustrative example
- •1.2.1. John
- •1.2.1.1. The unexcised body cell and the question of ownership
- •1.2.1.2. John’s interest in the excised body cell
- •1.2.1.3. Continuity of interests and John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.1.4. Enforceability of John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.2. Dr A and Dr B and the acquisition and transmission of property interests
- •1.2.3. The drugs company: constraints on the exercise of property rights
- •Notes and Questions 1.1
- •2 What we mean by ‘property’
- •2.1. Introduction
- •2.1.1. Property as a relationship and as a thing
- •2.1.2. Conceptualising ‘things’
- •2.1.3. Distinguishing property rights from other rights relating to things
- •2.1.4. Rights and other entitlements: Hohfeld’s rights analysis
- •2.1.4.1. Rights and duties, privileges and no-rights
- •2.1.4.2. Privileges and no-rights, and powers and liabilities
- •Abandonment
- •Effect of restrictions on alienation rights
- •2.1.4.3. Powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities
- •2.1.5. Hohfeldian analysis of dynamic property relationships
- •2.1.5.1. Stage 1: Before the grant of the option
- •2.1.5.2. Stage 2: Grant of the option
- •2.1.5.3. Stage 3: Exercise of the option
- •2.1.6. Property rights, property interests and ownership
- •Notes and Questions 2.1
- •2.2. Private property, communal property, state property and no property
- •2.2.1. Introduction
- •2.2.2.1. No-property: ownerless things
- •2.2.2.2. Open access communal property
- •Distinction between open access and limited access communal property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and no property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and state property
- •Distinction between allocation and provision of resources
- •Regulation of communal property
- •2.2.2.3. Limited access communal property
- •Distinction between communal property and co-ownership
- •Particular use rights rather than general use rights
- •2.2.2.4. State property
- •2.2.2.5. Anticommons property
- •2.3. Economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.1. What economic analysis seeks to achieve
- •Notes and Questions 2.2
- •2.3.2. Key concepts in the economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.2.1. Externalities
- •2.3.2.2. Transaction costs
- •Imperfect information
- •Costs of collective action
- •Free-riders and holdouts
- •2.3.2.3. Efficiency
- •Value
- •Pareto efficiency
- •Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
- •2.4. Things as thing and things as wealth
- •2.4.1. Functions of things
- •2.4.2. The idea of a fund
- •2.4.3. Thing versus wealth
- •2.4.4. Related conceptions
- •2.4.4.1. Fungibles and non-fungibles
- •2.4.4.2. ‘Use value’ and ‘exchange value’
- •2.4.4.3. Property and personhood
- •Use value/exchange value
- •A functional distinction
- •Notes and Questions 2.3
- •3 Justifications for property rights
- •3.1. Introduction: general and specific justifications
- •3.2. Economic justification of property rights
- •3.2.1. Property and scarcity
- •Notes and Questions 3.1
- •3.2.2. Viability of single property systems
- •3.2.3. Criteria for measuring the success of a particular form of ownership
- •3.3. John Locke’s justification for private property
- •3.3.1. What Locke was attempting to establish
- •3.3.2. The political context
- •3.3.3. The problem of consent
- •3.3.4. Locke’s justification for original acquisition
- •3.3.5. The nature of Locke’s commons
- •3.3.6. Why mixing labour with a thing should give rise to entitlement
- •3.3.7. The sufficiency proviso
- •3.3.8. The spoilation proviso
- •3.3.9. The theological dimension to Locke’s theory
- •3.3.10. Present relevance of Locke’s theory
- •Notes and Questions 3.2
- •4 Allocating property rights
- •4.1. Introduction
- •4.2. The first occupancy rule
- •4.2.1. Intuitive ordering
- •4.2.2. Preservation of public order
- •4.2.3. Simplicity
- •4.2.4. Signalling
- •4.2.5. The bond between person and possessions
- •4.2.6. The libertarian justification
- •4.2.7. The communitarian objection
- •4.2.8. Economic efficiency
- •Notes and Questions 4.1
- •4.3. New things
- •Notes and Questions 4.2
- •4.4. Capture
- •Notes and Questions 4.3
- •5.2. Iron-holds-the-whale
- •5.3. Split ownership
- •4.5. Colonisation and property rights
- •4.5.1. Introduction
- •4.5.2. The Milirrpum decision and the doctrine of terra nullius
- •4.5.3. Mabo (No. 2)
- •4.5.3.1. Terra nullius
- •4.5.3.2. Property, sovereignty and the doctrine of radical title
- •4.5.3.3. Extinguishment
- •Express extinguishment
- •Implied extinguishment by inconsistent grant
- •Abandonment
- •Surrender but not alienation
- •Notes and Questions 4.4
- •4.5.4. Developments since Mabo (No. 2)
- •5 Personal and proprietary interests
- •5.1. Characteristics of proprietary interests
- •5.1.1. General enforceability
- •5.1.2. Identifiability of subject-matter
- •5.1.2.1. The basic principle
- •5.1.2.2. Fluctuating assets
- •5.1.3. Significance of alienability
- •5.1.3.1. Inalienability of communal property
- •5.1.3.2. Status rights
- •5.1.3.3. Appurtenant rights
- •5.1.4. Requirement for certainty
- •5.1.5. The numerus clausus of property interests
- •5.1.6. Vindication of property rights
- •5.1.7. Termination
- •5.1.7.1. Abandonment
- •5.1.7.2. Disclaimer
- •5.1.7.3. Forfeiture
- •5.1.8. Property rights and insolvency
- •5.2. Special features of communal property rights
- •5.2.1. Present scope of communal property
- •5.2.1.1. Rights of common
- •5.2.1.2. Customary rights
- •Notes and Questions 5.1
- •5.3. Aboriginal land rights
- •5.3.1. Nature of native title
- •5.3.2. Alienability
- •5.3.3. Abandonment
- •5.3.4. Variation
- •5.3.5. Extent of native title
- •5.3.6. Is native title proprietary?
- •5.3.6.1. Blackburn J’s view in Milirrpum
- •5.3.6.2. The view of the High Court in Mabo (No. 2)
- •5.3.6.3. The Canadian view
- •Notes and Questions 5.2
- •6 Ownership
- •6.1. The nature of ownership
- •6.1.1. The basis of ownership
- •6.1.1.1. Ownership and people
- •6.1.1.2. Ownership and things
- •6.1.2. An outline of the difficulties encountered in any consideration of ownership
- •6.1.2.1. The different meanings of ownership
- •6.1.2.2. Disagreements about ownership
- •6.1.2.3. Contradictions within ownership
- •6.1.2.4. The division of ownership
- •Between different types of owner
- •Between owners and non-owners
- •Notes and Questions 6.1
- •Notes and Questions 6.2
- •6.2. The contents of ownership
- •Notes and Questions 6.3
- •Notes and Questions 6.4
- •6.3. The roles played by ownership
- •6.3.1. As a legal term of art
- •6.3.1.1. Ownership’s role in land
- •6.3.1.2. Ownership’s role in chattels
- •6.3.1.3. Ownership’s role in legislation
- •6.3.2. As an amorphous notion
- •6.3.2.1. Ownership as an organising idea
- •6.3.2.2. Ownership as a contested concept
- •6.4. The limitations of ownership
- •6.4.1. Nuisance
- •6.4.1.1. A brief introduction to nuisance
- •Public nuisance
- •Private nuisance
- •6.4.1.2. The requirements of private nuisance
- •6.4.1.3. Private nuisance and private property
- •What is protected?
- •6.4.1.4. The allocation of entitlements
- •The traditional criteria
- •The role of the market
- •The role of public policy
- •6.4.1.5. The protection of entitlements
- •Property rules
- •Liability rules
- •Rules of inalienability
- •Notes and Questions 6.5
- •Notes and Questions 6.6
- •Notes and Questions 6.7
- •Notes and Questions 6.8
- •Notes and Questions 6.9
- •A. Property and liability rules
- •B. Inalienable entitlements
- •Notes and Questions 6.10
- •6.5. Restrictive covenants
- •Notes and Questions 6.11
- •Notes and Questions 6.12
- •7 Possession
- •7.1. The nature of possession
- •7.1.1. Introduction
- •7.1.2. Possession, ownership and proprietary interests
- •7.1.3. What is possession?
- •7.1.3.1. Factual control
- •The relevance of title
- •The nature of the thing possessed
- •The purpose for which the thing is used
- •Control through agents and control of contents
- •7.1.3.2. Intention required
- •Intention to exclude
- •Effect of ignorance
- •Notes and Questions 7.1
- •7.2. Possession of land
- •7.2.1. Leases and licences
- •7.2.1.1. Why the distinction matters
- •7.2.1.2. Distinguishing leases from licences
- •Notes and Questions 7.2
- •7.2.2. Possession and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.1. General and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.2. Compatibility of particular and general use rights
- •7.3. Possession of goods: bailment
- •7.3.1. Nature of bailment
- •7.3.2. Rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee
- •7.4. Protection of possession
- •7.4.1. Protection of property rights by protection of possession
- •7.4.2. Tort and the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.1. The role of tort in the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.2. Scope of the property torts
- •Conversion
- •What amounts to a conversion of goods?
- •Remedies
- •Trespass
- •What amounts to trespass
- •Remedies
- •7.4.3. Self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.1. Survival of self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.2. Restrictions and deterrents
- •7.4.4. Unlawful eviction and harassment
- •7.4.5. Trespassing and the criminal law
- •Notes and Questions 7.3
- •8 Fragmentation of ownership
- •8.1. Introduction
- •8.2. Present and future interests
- •8.2.1. Interests in possession, in reversion and in remainder
- •8.2.2. Absolute entitlements, contingent entitlements and mere expectancies
- •8.2.2.1. Absolute entitlements
- •8.2.2.2. Contingent interests and expectancies
- •8.2.2.3. Alternative contingencies
- •8.2.3. When interests vest
- •8.2.4. Alienation, management and control
- •8.2.5. Interests of contingent duration
- •8.2.5.1. Determinable interests
- •8.2.5.2. Interests subject to a condition subsequent
- •8.2.5.3. Distinguishing determinable and forfeitable interests
- •8.2.6. Requirement of certainty
- •8.2.7. Successive interests in land and the doctrine of tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.1. Tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.2. Estates in particular use rights
- •8.2.7.3. Leases
- •8.2.8. Restrictions on the power to create future interests
- •8.3. Legal and equitable interests
- •8.3.1. Origin of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.1.1. Failed formality interests
- •8.3.1.2. Novel interests
- •8.3.2. Legal and equitable interests now
- •8.3.2.1. Interests in land
- •8.3.2.2. Interests in goods
- •8.3.3. The significance of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.4. Three common fallacies
- •8.3.4.1. Equitable interests and beneficial interests
- •8.3.4.2. Over-identification of equitable interests with trusts
- •8.3.4.3. Absolute ownership does not include equitable beneficial ownership
- •Notes and Questions 8.1
- •8.4. Fragmentation of management, control and benefit
- •8.4.1. Corporate property holding
- •8.4.2. Managerial property holding
- •8.4.2.1. Trust
- •The trustee
- •The settlor
- •The beneficiaries
- •8.4.2.2. Administration of property on death
- •8.4.2.3. Bankruptcy and liquidation
- •Notes and Questions 8.2
- •8.5. Group ownership
- •8.6. General and particular use rights
- •Notes and Questions 8.3
- •9 Recognition of new property interests
- •9.1. Why are certain interests regarded as property?
- •9.1.1. The function of property
- •9.1.1.1. As a means of allocating scarce resources
- •9.1.1.2. As an incentive to promote their management
- •9.1.1.3. As a moral, philosophical or political statement
- •9.1.2. The danger of property
- •9.1.3. The requirements of property
- •9.2. The dynamic nature of property
- •9.2.1. The recognition and limits of the covenant as a proprietary interest
- •Notes and Questions 9.1
- •9.2.2. The recognition of a proprietary right to occupy the matrimonial home
- •Notes and Questions 9.2
- •9.3. The general reluctance to recognise new property rights
- •9.3.1. The facts of Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor
- •9.3.2. The views of the majority
- •9.3.3. The views of the minority
- •9.3.4. The significance of the case
- •Notes and Questions 9.3
- •9.4. A comparative confirmation and an economic critique
- •Notes and Questions 9.4
- •9.5. The future of property
- •9.5.1. The new property thesis
- •Notes and Questions 9.5
- •Notes and Questions 9.6
- •10 Title
- •10.1. What we mean by ‘title’
- •10.2. Acquiring title: derivative and original acquisition of title
- •10.2.1. Derivative acquisition: disposition or grant
- •10.2.2. Original acquisition
- •10.3. Relativity of title
- •10.4. Proving title
- •10.4.1. Role of registration
- •10.4.2. Possession as a root of title
- •10.4.3. Provenance
- •10.4.4. Extinguishing title by limitation of action rules
- •10.4.5. Relativity of title and the ius tertii
- •10.5. The nemo dat rule
- •10.5.1. Scope of the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2. General principles applicable to all property
- •10.5.2.1. Registration and the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2.2. Dispositions to volunteers
- •10.5.2.3. Powers of sale
- •10.5.3. The application of the nemo dat rule to goods
- •10.5.4. The application of the nemo dat rule to money
- •10.5.5. The application of the nemo dat rule to land
- •10.5.5.1. The general principle
- •10.5.5.2. After-acquired property
- •10.5.5.3. Interests by estoppel
- •10.6. Legal and equitable title
- •11 Acquiring title by possession
- •11.1. Introduction
- •11.2. The operation of adverse possession rules
- •11.2.1. Unregistered land
- •11.2.2. Registered land
- •11.2.3. What counts as ‘adverse’ possession
- •11.2.4. Effect on third party interests
- •11.3. Why established possession should defeat the paper owner
- •11.4. Adverse possession and registration
- •11.5. Good faith and the adverse possessor
- •1. Tension between principle and proof
- •Notes and Questions 11.1
- •A. Lockean entitlement
- •B. Utilitarianism
- •C. Property and personhood
- •B. Property theory and adverse possession
- •Notes and Questions 11.2
- •Notes and Questions 11.3
- •Stale claims in registered land
- •Stale claims under the 2002 Act
- •Distinguishing the ‘good’ squatter from the ‘bad’ squatter
- •Problems of proof
- •Effect of the 2002 Act changes on the incidence of adverse possession
- •The incompatibility argument
- •Notes and Questions 11.4
- •11.6. Goods
- •11.6.1. Taking and theft
- •11.6.2. Protection of title by tort
- •11.6.3. The Limitation Act 1980 and title to goods
- •11.6.4. Finders
- •Notes and Questions 11.5
- •12 Transfer and grant
- •12.1. Derivative acquisition
- •12.2. Formalities
- •12.2.1. Nature and content of formalities rules
- •12.2.2. Registration and electronic transactions
- •12.2.3. Validity and enforceability against third parties
- •12.2.4. Effect of compliance on passing of title
- •12.2.5. Transactions excepted from formalities rules
- •12.2.5.1. Equitable modification of legal rules
- •12.2.5.2. Implied rights
- •12.2.5.3. Rights acquired by possession or prescription
- •12.2.6. Deeds and prescribed forms
- •12.2.7. Why have formalities rules
- •12.2.7.1. The evidentiary function
- •12.2.7.2. The cautionary function
- •12.2.7.3. The channelling function
- •12.2.7.4. Other functions
- •Clarifying terms
- •Publicity
- •State functions
- •12.2.8. Disadvantages
- •12.2.8.1. Hard cases
- •12.2.8.2. Costs
- •Notes and Questions 12.1
- •Notes and Questions 12.2
- •12.3. Contractual rights to property interests
- •12.3.1. Estate contracts and the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale
- •12.3.2. Application to property other than land
- •12.3.3. The failed formalities rule
- •12.3.3.1. The general rule
- •12.3.3.2. The failed formalities rule as it applies to land
- •12.3.3.3. Failed formalities rule as it applies to other property
- •Notes and Questions 12.3
- •Notes and Questions 12.4
- •12.3.4. Options to purchase, rights of pre-emption and rights of first refusal
- •Notes and Questions 12.5
- •Notes and Questions 12.6
- •12.4. Unascertained property
- •12.4.1. The problem of identification
- •12.4.2. Unascertained goods
- •12.4.3. Other unascertained property
- •Notes and Questions 12.7
- •13 Acquiring interests by other methods
- •13.1. Introduction
- •13.2. The difference between adverse possession and prescription
- •13.3. Why long use should give rise to entitlement
- •13.4. Rationale
- •13.4.1. Ascendancy of the presumed grant rationale
- •13.4.2. Effect of the ‘revolting fiction’
- •13.5. When long use gives rise to a prescriptive right
- •13.5.1. The problem of negative uses
- •13.5.2. Rights that can be granted but not acquired by prescription
- •13.6. User as of right and the problem of acquiescence
- •13.7. The future of prescription
- •Recommendation in favour of abolition
- •Minority view in favour of retention
- •Notes and Questions 13.1
- •14 Enforceability and priority of interests
- •14.1. Rationale of enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2. Enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2.1. The basic rules
- •14.2.2. Impact of registration
- •Notes and Questions 14.1
- •14.3. The doctrine of notice
- •14.3.1. Notice
- •14.3.2. Good faith
- •14.3.3. Effectiveness of the doctrine of notice as an enforceability rule
- •Notes and Questions 14.2
- •14.4. Overreaching
- •14.4.1. Nature and scope of overreaching
- •14.4.2. Operation of overreaching
- •14.4.3. Overreaching the interests of occupying beneficiaries
- •14.4.4. Transactions capable of overreaching beneficiaries’ interests
- •14.4.5. The two-trustees rule
- •Introductory
- •Overreaching
- •Safeguard for beneficiaries
- •Change of circumstances
- •Protecting occupation of property
- •Principal recommendation
- •Notes and Questions 14.3
- •15 Registration
- •15.1. What are registration systems for?
- •15.2. Characteristics of the English land registration system
- •15.2.1. Privacy
- •15.2.2. Comprehensiveness
- •15.2.3. Boundaries
- •15.2.4. Restricted class of registrable interests
- •15.2.4.1. Distinguishing ‘substantive’ registration and ‘protection’ on the register
- •15.2.4.2. Registration
- •15.2.4.3. ‘Protection’ by notice or restriction
- •15.2.4.4. The overriding interest class
- •15.2.5. The mirror, curtain and guarantee principles
- •THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’
- •THE ‘CURTAIN PRINCIPLE’
- •15.2.6. Consequences of non-registration
- •Notes and Questions 15.1
- •Compulsory use of electronic conveyancing
- •Do-it-yourself conveyancing
- •The objective of the power
- •The application of the power
- •Notes and Questions 15.2
- •15.3. Enforceability and priority of interests under the Land Registration Act 2002
- •15.3.1. Registrable interests
- •15.3.2. All other interests
- •15.3.2.1. Enforceability
- •15.3.2.2. Priority
- •15.4. Overriding interests
- •15.4.1. Justifications for overriding interests
- •15.4.2. Principles to be applied
- •15.4.3. Overriding interests under the 2002 Act
- •15.4.4. Easements and profits
- •15.4.5. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 1925 Act
- •15.4.5.1. What rights are covered?
- •5.4.5.2. Actual occupation
- •Physical presence
- •Personal occupation
- •Non-residential premises
- •15.4.6. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 2002 Act
- •15.4.6.1. Causal link between interest and occupation
- •15.4.6.2. Meaning of ‘actual occupation’
- •15.4.6.3. The ‘notice’ element
- •15.4.6.4. Can minors be in actual occupation?
- •15.4.6.5. Occupation of part
- •15.4.7. Complexity
- •Notes and Questions 15.3
- •15.5. Indemnity
- •15.5.1. Function of indemnity
- •15.5.2. Shortfall in the provision of indemnity
- •15.5.3. Cost
- •17 Leases and bailment
- •17.1. Introduction
- •17.2. Leases and bailments compared
- •17.2.1. Consensuality
- •17.2.2. Contract
- •17.2.3. Enforcement
- •17.2.4. Duration and purpose
- •17.2.5. Beneficial use
- •17.2.6. Proprietary status
- •17.2.7. Inherent obligations of the possessor
- •17.3. Leases
- •17.3.1. Nature of the lease
- •17.3.1.1. Duration: the four basic categories
- •The legal position
- •Length of fixed-term leases in practice
- •Commonhold as an alternative to the long residential lease
- •Commercial premises
- •Assignment and premature termination of fixed-term lease
- •17.3.1.3. Periodic tenancies
- •Nature
- •Contractual fetters on notice to quit
- •17.3.1.4. Tenancy at will
- •Tenancy at sufferance
- •Notes and Questions 17.1
- •17.3.1.5. Certainty of duration
- •Notes and Questions 17.2
- •Passage 2
- •Passage 3
- •Passage 4
- •Notes and Questions 17.3
- •17.3.1.7. The tolerated trespasser status
- •Notes and Questions 17.4
- •Notes and Questions 17.5
- •17.3.2. Alienability
- •17.3.2.1. Inherent alienability
- •Alienability of tenant’s interest
- •Subleases and other derivative interests granted by the tenant
- •Effect of termination of lease on derivative interests
- •Alienability of landlord’s interest
- •Concurrent leases and other derivative interests granted by the landlord
- •17.3.2.2. Restrictions on alienability
- •17.3.2.3. Statutory control of contractual restrictions
- •Notes and Questions 17.6
- •17.3.3. Effect of alienation on enforceability
- •17.3.3.1. Introduction: the basic principle
- •Automatic transmission of benefit and burden of proprietary terms: the privity of estate principle
- •Post-assignment liability: the privity of contract principle
- •17.3.3.3. Derivative interest holders
- •17.4. Bailment
- •17.4.1. Essential features of bailment
- •17.4.2. Categories of bailment
- •17.4.3. Characteristics of bailment
- •17.4.4. Liabilities of the bailee
- •Notes and Questions 17.7
- •17.4.5. Is bailment proprietary?
- •17.4.5.1. Possession and exclusivity
- •17.4.5.2. Alienability
- •17.4.5.3. Enforceability against third parties
- •17.4.5.4. Other proprietary indicia
- •18 Security interests
- •18.1. The nature and function of security
- •18.1.1. Nature of security
- •18.1.1.1. Terminology problems
- •18.1.1.2. Legal and equitable rights to redeem
- •18.1.1.3. Creation, attachment and perfection of security
- •18.1.2. Function
- •18.1.2.1. Right of first recourse
- •18.1.2.2. Attachment to the asset
- •18.1.2.4. The hostage function
- •18.1.2.5. Signalling, monitoring and control
- •18.1.3. Efficiency
- •18.1.4. Use of security
- •18.2. Forms of security
- •18.2.1. Property transfer securities: the mortgage
- •18.2.2. Possessory securities: pledge or pawn
- •18.2.3. Hypothecations: the charge
- •18.2.4. Liens
- •18.2.5. Property retention securities
- •18.2.6. Charge by way of legal mortgage
- •Notes and Questions 18.1
- •18.3. Control over the terms of the relationship
- •18.3.1. Equitable supervisory jurisdiction
- •18.3.2. The Kreglinger principles
- •18.3.3. Statutory intervention
- •Notes and Questions 18.2
- •18.4. Enforcement of security
- •18.4.1. Remedies
- •18.4.2. Possession
- •18.4.3. Sale
- •18.4.3.1. When the power arises
- •18.4.3.2. When the power becomes exercisable
- •18.4.4. Duties on enforcement
- •General principles
- •The handling of arrears: initial action taken by lenders
- •Alleviating arrears problems
- •The levying of charges on accounts in arrear
- •Methods of obtaining possession
- •Proceeds of sale
- •Indemnity insurance
- •Loss recovery procedures
- •Notes and Questions 18.3
- •16 Co-ownership
- •16.1. Introduction
- •16.2.1. Basic concepts
- •OWNERSHIP IN COMMON
- •JOINT OWNERSHIP
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN LAND
- •Notes and Questions 16.1
- •Unity of possession
- •Unity of interest
- •Unity of title
- •Unity of time
- •16.2.2. A comparison of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
- •16.2.2.1. Four unities versus one
- •Notes and Questions 16.2
- •16.2.2.2. The right of survivorship (and how to avoid it)
- •Severance at common law
- •16.2.2.3. Acting upon one’s share
- •16.2.2.4. Mutual agreement
- •16.2.2.5. Mutual conduct
- •16.2.2.6. Statutory severance
- •Notes and Questions 16.3
- •16.2.3. Use of co-owned property
- •16.2.3.1. Land
- •12 THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •13 EXCLUSION AND RESTRICTION OF RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •Notes and Questions 16.4
- •16.2.3.2. Chattels
- •Notes and Questions 16.5
- •16.2.4. Sale and other dispositions of co-owned property
- •16.2.4.1. Land
- •Notes and Questions 16.6
- •16.2.4.2. Chattels
- •16.3. Other forms of co-ownership
- •16.3.1. Commonhold
- •16.3.2. Unincorporated associations
- •Notes and Questions 16.7
- •16.3.3. Extending the limits of co-ownership: public trusts
- •Bibliography
- •Index
Ownership 243
B. Inalienable entitlements
Thus far, we have focused on the questions of when society should protect an entitlement by property or liability rules. However, there remain many entitlements which involve a still greater degree of societal intervention: the law not only decides who is to own something and what price is to be paid for it if it is taken or destroyed, but also regulates its sale – by, for example, prescribing pre-conditions for a valid sale or forbidding a sale altogether. Although these rules of inalienability are substantially different from the property and liability rules, their use can be analyzed in terms of the same efficiency and distributional goals that underlie the use of the other two rules.
While at first glance efficiency objectives may seem undermined by limitations on the ability to engage in transactions, closer analysis suggests that there are instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency is more closely approximated by such limitations. This might occur when a transaction would create significant externalities – costs to third parties.
For instance, if Taney were allowed to sell his land to Chase, a polluter, he would injure his neighbor Marshall by lowering the value of Marshall’s land. Conceivably, Marshall could pay Taney not to sell his land; but, because there are many injured Marshalls, free-loader and information costs make such transactions practically impossible. The state could protect the Marshalls and yet facilitate the sale of the land by giving the Marshalls an entitlement to prevent Taney’s sale to Chase but only protecting the entitlement by a liability rule. It might, for instance, charge an excise tax on all sales of land to polluters equal to its estimate of the external cost to the Marshalls of the sale. But where there are so many injured Marshalls that the price required under the liability rule is likely to be high enough so that no one would be willing to pay it, then setting up the machinery for collective valuation will be wasteful. Barring the sale to polluters will be the most efficient result because it is clear that avoiding pollution is cheaper than paying its costs – including its costs to the Marshalls.
Another instance in which external costs may justify inalienability occurs when external costs do not lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary. This nonmonetizability is characteristic of one category of external costs which, as a practical matter, seems frequently to lead us to rules of inalienability. Such external costs are often called moralisms.
If Taney is allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall may be harmed, simply because Marshall is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die because they have sold a kidney. Again, Marshall could pay Taney not to sell his freedom to Chase the slaveowner; but again, because Marshall is not one but many individuals, free-loader and information costs make such transactions practically impossible. Again, it might seem that the state could intervene by objectively valuing the external cost to Marshall and requiring Chase to pay that cost. But since the external cost to Marshall does not lend itself to an acceptable objective measurement, such liability rules are not appropriate.
In the case of Taney selling land to Chase, the polluter, they were inappropriate because we knew that the costs to Taney and the Marshalls exceeded the benefits to
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Chase. Here, though we are not certain of how a cost–benefit analysis would come out, liability rules are inappropriate because any monetization is, by hypothesis, out of the question. The state must, therefore, either ignore the external costs to Marshall, or if it judges them great enough, forbid the transaction that gave rise to them by making Taney’s freedom inalienable.
Obviously, we will not always value the external harm of a moralism enough to prohibit the sale. And obviously also, external costs other than moralisms may be sufficiently hard to value to make rules of inalienability appropriate in certain circumstances; this reason for rules of inalienability, however, does seem most often germane in situations where moralisms are involved . . .
. . . Finally, just as efficiency goals sometimes dictate the use of rules of inalienability, so, of course, do distributional goals. Whether an entitlement may be sold or not often affects directly who is richer and who is poorer. Prohibiting the sale of babies makes poorer those who can cheaply produce babies and richer those who through some nonmarket device get free an ‘unwanted’ baby. Prohibiting exculpatory clauses in product sales makes richer those who were injured by a product defect and poorer those who were not injured and who paid more for the product because the exculpatory clause was forbidden. Favoring the specific group that has benefited may or may not have been the reason for the prohibition on bargaining. What is important is that, regardless of the reason for barring a contract, a group did gain from the prohibition.
This should suffice to put us on guard, for it suggests that direct distributional motives may lie behind asserted nondistributional grounds for inalienability, whether they be paternalism, self-paternalism, or externalities. This does not mean that giving weight to distributional goals is undesirable. It clearly is desirable where on efficiency grounds society is indifferent between an alienable and an inalienable entitlement and distributional goals favor one approach or the other. It may well be desirable even when distributional goals are achieved at some efficiency costs. The danger may be, however, that what is justified on, for example, paternalism grounds is really a hidden way of accruing distributional benefits for a group whom we would not otherwise wish to benefit. For example, we may use certain types of zoning to preserve open spaces on the grounds that the poor will be happier, though they do not know it now. And open spaces may indeed make the poor happier in the long run. But the zoning that preserves open space also makes housing in the suburbs more expensive and it may be that the whole plan is aimed at securing distributional benefits to the suburban dweller regardless of the poor’s happiness.
I I I . T H E F R A M E W O R K A N D P O L L U T I O N C O N T R O L R U L E S
Nuisance or pollution is one of the most interesting areas where the question of who will be given an entitlement, and how it will be protected, is in frequent issue. Traditionally, and very ably in the recent article by Professor Michelman, the nuisancepollution problem is viewed in terms of three rules. First, Taney may not pollute unless his neighbor (his only neighbor let us assume), Marshall, allows it (Marshall may enjoin Taney’s nuisance). Second, Taney may pollute but must compensate Marshall for damages caused (nuisance is found but the remedy is limited to damages). Third,
Ownership 245
Taney may pollute at will and can only be stopped by Marshall if Marshall pays him off (Taney’s pollution is not held to be a nuisance to Marshall). In our terminology rules one and two (nuisance with injunction, and with damages only) are entitlements to Marshall. The first is an entitlement to be free from pollution and is protected by a property rule; the second is also an entitlement to be free from pollution but is protected only by a liability rule. Rule three (no nuisance) is instead an entitlement to Taney protected by a property rule, for only by buying Taney out at Taney’s price can Marshall end the pollution.
The very statement of these rules in the context of our framework suggests that something is missing. Missing is a fourth rule representing an entitlement in Taney to pollute, but an entitlement which is protected only by a liability rule. The fourth rule, really a kind of partial [compulsory purchase] coupled with a benefits tax, can be stated as follows: Marshal may stop Taney from polluting, but if he does he must compensate Taney.
As a practical matter it will be easy to see why even legal writers as astute as Professor Michelman have ignored this rule. Unlike the first three it does not often lend itself to judicial imposition for a number of good legal process reasons. For example, even if Taney’s injuries could practicably be measured, apportionment of the duty of compensation among many Marshalls would present problems for which courts are not well suited. If only those Marshalls who voluntarily asserted the right to enjoin Taney’s pollution were required to pay the compensation, there would be insuperable free-loader problems. If, on the other hand, the liability rule entitled one of the Marshalls alone to enjoin the pollution and required all the benefited Marshalls to pay their share of the compensation, the courts would be faced with the immensely difficult task of determining who was benefited how much and imposing a benefits tax accordingly, all the while observing procedural limits within which courts are expected to function.
The fourth rule is thus not part of the cases legal scholars read when they study nuisance law, and is therefore easily ignored by them. But it is available, and may sometimes make more sense than any of the three competing approaches. Indeed, in one form or another, it may well be the most frequent device employed. To appreciate the utility of the fourth rule and to compare it with the other three rules, we will examine why we might choose any of the given rules.
We would employ rule one (entitlement to be free from pollution protected by a property rule) from an economic efficiency point of view if we believed that the polluter, Taney, could avoid or reduce the costs of pollution more cheaply than the pollutee, Marshall. Or to put it another way, Taney would be enjoinable if he were in a better position to balance the costs of polluting against the costs of not polluting. We would employ rule three (entitlement to pollute protected by a property rule) again solely from an economic efficiency standpoint, if we made the converse judgment on who could best balance the harm of pollution against its avoidance costs. If we were wrong in our judgments and if transactions between Marshall and Taney were costless or even very cheap, the entitlement under rules one or three would be traded and an economically efficient result would occur in either case. If we entitled Taney to pollute
246 Property Law
and Marshall valued clean air more than Taney valued the pollution, Marshall would pay Taney to stop polluting even though no nuisance was found. If we entitled Marshall to enjoin the pollution and the right to pollute was worth more to Taney than freedom from pollution was to Marshall, Taney would pay Marshall not to seek an injunction or would buy Marshall’s land and sell it to someone who would agree not to seek an injunction. As we have assumed no one else was hurt by the pollution, Taney could now pollute even though the initial entitlement, based on a wrong guess of who was the cheapest avoider of the costs involved allowed the pollution to be enjoined. Wherever transactions between Taney and Marshall are easy, and wherever economic efficiency is our goal, we could employ entitlements protected by property rules even though we would not be sure that the entitlement chosen was the right one. Transactions as described above would cure the error. While the entitlement might have important distributional effects, it would not substantially undercut economic efficiency.
The moment we assume, however, that transactions are not cheap, the situation changes dramatically. Assume we enjoin Taney and there are 10,000 injured Marshalls. Now even if the right to pollute is worth more to Taney than the right to be free from pollution is to the sum of the Marshalls, the injunction will probably stand. The cost of buying out all the Marshalls, given holdout problems, is likely to be too great, and an equivalent of [compulsory purchase] in Taney would be needed to alter the initial injunction. Conversely, if we denied a nuisance remedy, the 10,000 Marshalls could only with enormous difficulty, given free-loader problems, get together to buy out even one Taney and prevent the pollution. This would be so even if the pollution harm was greater than the value to Taney of the right to pollute.
If, however, transaction costs are not symmetrical, we may still be able to use the property rule. Assume that Taney can buy the Marshalls’ entitlements easily because holdouts are for some reason absent, but that the Marshalls have great free-loader problems in buying out Taney. In this situation the entitlement should be granted to the Marshalls unless we are sure the Marshalls are the cheapest avoiders of pollution costs. Where we do not know the identity of the cheapest cost avoider it is better to entitle the Marshalls to be free of pollution because, even if we are wrong in our initial placement of the entitlement, that is, even if the Marshalls are the cheapest cost avoiders, Taney will buy out the Marshalls and economic efficiency will be achieved. Had we chosen the converse entitlement and been wrong, the Marshalls could not have bought out Taney. Unfortunately, transaction costs are often high on both sides and an initial entitlement, though incorrect in terms of economic efficiency, will not be altered in the marketplace . . .
[W]e are likely to turn to liability rules whenever we are uncertain whether the polluter or the pollutees can most cheaply avoid the cost of pollution. We are only likely to use liability rules where we are uncertain because, if we are certain, the costs of liability rules – essentially the costs of collectively valuing the damages to all concerned plus the cost in coercion to those who would not sell at the collectively determined figure – are unnecessary. They are unnecessary because transaction costs and bargaining barriers become irrelevant when we are certain who is the cheapest cost avoider;
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economic efficiency will be attained without transactions by making the correct initial entitlement.
As a practical matter we often are uncertain who the cheapest cost avoider is. In such cases, traditional legal doctrine tends to find a nuisance but imposes only damages on Taney payable to the Marshalls. This way, if the amount of damages Taney is made to pay is close to the injury caused, economic efficiency will have had its due; if he cannot make a go of it, the nuisance was not worth its costs. The entitlement to the Marshalls to be free from pollution unless compensated, however, will have been given not because it was thought that polluting was probably worth less to Taney than freedom from pollution was worth to the Marshalls, nor even because on some distributional basis we preferred to charge the cost to Taney rather than to the Marshalls. It was so placed simply because we did not know whether Taney desired to pollute more than the Marshalls desired to be free from pollution, and the only way we thought we could test out the value of the pollution was by the only liability rule we thought we had. This was rule two, the imposition of nuisance damages on Taney. At least this would be the position of a court concerned with economic efficiency which believed itself limited to rules one, two, and three.
Rule four gives at least the possibility that the opposite entitlement may also lead to economic efficiency in a situation of uncertainty. Suppose for the moment that a mechanism exists for collectively assessing the damage resulting to Taney from being stopped from polluting by the Marshalls, and a mechanism also exists for collectively assessing the benefit to each of the Marshalls from such cessation. Thus – assuming the same degree of accuracy in collective valuation as exists in rule two (the nuisance damage rule) – the Marshalls would stop the pollution if it harmed them more than it benefited Taney. If this is possible, then even if we thought it necessary to use a liability rule, we would still be free to give the entitlement to Taney or Marshall for whatever reasons, efficiency or distributional, we desired.
Actually, the issue is still somewhat more complicated. For just as transaction costs are not necessarily symmetrical under the two converse property rule entitlements, so also the liability rule equivalents of transaction costs – the cost of valuing collectively and of coercing compliance with that valuation – may not be symmetrical under the two converse liability rules. Nuisance damages may be very hard to value, and the costs of informing all the injured of their rights and getting them into court may be prohibitive. Instead, the assessment of the object damage to Taney from foregoing his pollution may be cheap and so might the assessment of the relative benefits to all Marshalls of such freedom from pollution. But the opposite may also be the case. As a result, just as the choice of which property entitlement may be based on the asymmetry of transaction costs and hence on the greater amenability of one property entitlement to market corrections, so might the choice between liability entitlements be based on the asymmetry of the costs of collective determination.
The introduction of distributional considerations makes the existence of the fourth possibility even more significant. One does not need to go into all the permutations of the possible tradeoffs between efficiency and distributional goals under the four rules to show this. A simple example should suffice. Assume a factory which, by using cheap coal,
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pollutes a very wealthy section of town and employs many low income workers to produce a product purchased primarily by the poor; assume also a distributional goal that favors equality of wealth. Rule one – enjoin the nuisance – would possibly have desirable economic efficiency results (if the pollution hurt the homeowners more than it saved the factory in coal costs), but it would have disastrous distribution effects. It would also have undesirable efficiency effects if the initial judgment on costs of avoidance had been wrong and transaction costs were high. Rule two – nuisance damages – would allow a testing of the economic efficiency of eliminating the pollution, even in the presence of high transaction costs, but would quite possibly put the factory out of business or diminish output and thus have the same income distribution effects as rule one. Rule three – no nuisance – would have favorable distributional effects since it might protect the income of the workers. But if the pollution harm was greater to the homeowners than the cost of avoiding it by using a better coal, and if transaction costs – holdout problems – were such that homeowners could not unite to pay the factory to use better coal, rule three would have unsatisfactory efficiency effects. Rule four – payment of damages to the factory after allowing the homeowners to compel it to use better coal, and assessment of the cost of these damages to the homeowners – would be the only one which would accomplish both the distributional and efficiency goals.
An equally good hypothetical for any of the rules can be constructed. Moreover, the problems of coercion may as a practical matter be extremely severe under rule four. How do the homeowners decide to stop the factory’s use of low grade coal? How do we assess the damages and their proportional allocation in terms of benefits to the homeowner? But equivalent problems may often be as great for rule two. How do we value the damages to each of the many homeowners? How do we inform the homeowners of their rights to damages? How do we evaluate and limit the administrative expenses of the court actions this solution implies?
The seriousness of the problem depends under each of the liability rules on the number of people whose ‘benefits’ or ‘damages’ one is assessing and the expense and likelihood of error in such assessment. A judgment on these questions is necessary to an evaluation of the possible economic efficiency benefits of employing one rule rather than another. The relative ease of making such assessments through different institutions may explain why we often employ the courts for rule two and get to rule four – when we do get there – only through political bodies which may, for example, prohibit pollution, or ‘take’ the entitlement to build a supersonic plane by a kind of [compulsory purchase], paying compensation to those injured by these decisions. But all this does not, in any sense, diminish the importance of the fact that an awareness of the possibility of an entitlement to pollute, but one protected only by a liability rule, may in some instances allow us best to combine our distributional and efficiency goals.
We have said that we would say little about justice, and so we shall. But it should be clear that, if rule four might enable us best to combine efficiency goals with distributional goals, it might also enable us best to combine those same efficiency goals with other goals that are often described in justice language. For example, assume that the factory in our hypothetical was using cheap coal before any of the wealthy houses were built. In these circumstances, rule four will not only achieve the desirable efficiency and
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- #13.12.20224.1 Кб8._!!The Property Platform in Anglo-American Law and the Primacy of the Property Concept.pdf
- #13.12.20224.1 Кб8._(Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law) Stephen R. Munzer-New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property -Cambridge University Press (2007).pdf
- #13.12.20224.1 Кб2._(Critical Approaches to Law) Margaret Davies-Property_ Meanings, Histories, Theories-Routledge-Cavendish (2007).pdf