- •Contents
- •Preface
- •Acknowledgments
- •Table of cases
- •Table of statutes
- •Table of statutory instruments
- •Table of treaties
- •Table of EC legislation
- •1 Property law: the issues
- •1.1. Basic definition
- •1.2. Illustrative example
- •1.2.1. John
- •1.2.1.1. The unexcised body cell and the question of ownership
- •1.2.1.2. John’s interest in the excised body cell
- •1.2.1.3. Continuity of interests and John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.1.4. Enforceability of John’s interest in the cell line
- •1.2.2. Dr A and Dr B and the acquisition and transmission of property interests
- •1.2.3. The drugs company: constraints on the exercise of property rights
- •Notes and Questions 1.1
- •2 What we mean by ‘property’
- •2.1. Introduction
- •2.1.1. Property as a relationship and as a thing
- •2.1.2. Conceptualising ‘things’
- •2.1.3. Distinguishing property rights from other rights relating to things
- •2.1.4. Rights and other entitlements: Hohfeld’s rights analysis
- •2.1.4.1. Rights and duties, privileges and no-rights
- •2.1.4.2. Privileges and no-rights, and powers and liabilities
- •Abandonment
- •Effect of restrictions on alienation rights
- •2.1.4.3. Powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities
- •2.1.5. Hohfeldian analysis of dynamic property relationships
- •2.1.5.1. Stage 1: Before the grant of the option
- •2.1.5.2. Stage 2: Grant of the option
- •2.1.5.3. Stage 3: Exercise of the option
- •2.1.6. Property rights, property interests and ownership
- •Notes and Questions 2.1
- •2.2. Private property, communal property, state property and no property
- •2.2.1. Introduction
- •2.2.2.1. No-property: ownerless things
- •2.2.2.2. Open access communal property
- •Distinction between open access and limited access communal property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and no property
- •Distinction between open access communal property and state property
- •Distinction between allocation and provision of resources
- •Regulation of communal property
- •2.2.2.3. Limited access communal property
- •Distinction between communal property and co-ownership
- •Particular use rights rather than general use rights
- •2.2.2.4. State property
- •2.2.2.5. Anticommons property
- •2.3. Economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.1. What economic analysis seeks to achieve
- •Notes and Questions 2.2
- •2.3.2. Key concepts in the economic analysis of property rights
- •2.3.2.1. Externalities
- •2.3.2.2. Transaction costs
- •Imperfect information
- •Costs of collective action
- •Free-riders and holdouts
- •2.3.2.3. Efficiency
- •Value
- •Pareto efficiency
- •Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
- •2.4. Things as thing and things as wealth
- •2.4.1. Functions of things
- •2.4.2. The idea of a fund
- •2.4.3. Thing versus wealth
- •2.4.4. Related conceptions
- •2.4.4.1. Fungibles and non-fungibles
- •2.4.4.2. ‘Use value’ and ‘exchange value’
- •2.4.4.3. Property and personhood
- •Use value/exchange value
- •A functional distinction
- •Notes and Questions 2.3
- •3 Justifications for property rights
- •3.1. Introduction: general and specific justifications
- •3.2. Economic justification of property rights
- •3.2.1. Property and scarcity
- •Notes and Questions 3.1
- •3.2.2. Viability of single property systems
- •3.2.3. Criteria for measuring the success of a particular form of ownership
- •3.3. John Locke’s justification for private property
- •3.3.1. What Locke was attempting to establish
- •3.3.2. The political context
- •3.3.3. The problem of consent
- •3.3.4. Locke’s justification for original acquisition
- •3.3.5. The nature of Locke’s commons
- •3.3.6. Why mixing labour with a thing should give rise to entitlement
- •3.3.7. The sufficiency proviso
- •3.3.8. The spoilation proviso
- •3.3.9. The theological dimension to Locke’s theory
- •3.3.10. Present relevance of Locke’s theory
- •Notes and Questions 3.2
- •4 Allocating property rights
- •4.1. Introduction
- •4.2. The first occupancy rule
- •4.2.1. Intuitive ordering
- •4.2.2. Preservation of public order
- •4.2.3. Simplicity
- •4.2.4. Signalling
- •4.2.5. The bond between person and possessions
- •4.2.6. The libertarian justification
- •4.2.7. The communitarian objection
- •4.2.8. Economic efficiency
- •Notes and Questions 4.1
- •4.3. New things
- •Notes and Questions 4.2
- •4.4. Capture
- •Notes and Questions 4.3
- •5.2. Iron-holds-the-whale
- •5.3. Split ownership
- •4.5. Colonisation and property rights
- •4.5.1. Introduction
- •4.5.2. The Milirrpum decision and the doctrine of terra nullius
- •4.5.3. Mabo (No. 2)
- •4.5.3.1. Terra nullius
- •4.5.3.2. Property, sovereignty and the doctrine of radical title
- •4.5.3.3. Extinguishment
- •Express extinguishment
- •Implied extinguishment by inconsistent grant
- •Abandonment
- •Surrender but not alienation
- •Notes and Questions 4.4
- •4.5.4. Developments since Mabo (No. 2)
- •5 Personal and proprietary interests
- •5.1. Characteristics of proprietary interests
- •5.1.1. General enforceability
- •5.1.2. Identifiability of subject-matter
- •5.1.2.1. The basic principle
- •5.1.2.2. Fluctuating assets
- •5.1.3. Significance of alienability
- •5.1.3.1. Inalienability of communal property
- •5.1.3.2. Status rights
- •5.1.3.3. Appurtenant rights
- •5.1.4. Requirement for certainty
- •5.1.5. The numerus clausus of property interests
- •5.1.6. Vindication of property rights
- •5.1.7. Termination
- •5.1.7.1. Abandonment
- •5.1.7.2. Disclaimer
- •5.1.7.3. Forfeiture
- •5.1.8. Property rights and insolvency
- •5.2. Special features of communal property rights
- •5.2.1. Present scope of communal property
- •5.2.1.1. Rights of common
- •5.2.1.2. Customary rights
- •Notes and Questions 5.1
- •5.3. Aboriginal land rights
- •5.3.1. Nature of native title
- •5.3.2. Alienability
- •5.3.3. Abandonment
- •5.3.4. Variation
- •5.3.5. Extent of native title
- •5.3.6. Is native title proprietary?
- •5.3.6.1. Blackburn J’s view in Milirrpum
- •5.3.6.2. The view of the High Court in Mabo (No. 2)
- •5.3.6.3. The Canadian view
- •Notes and Questions 5.2
- •6 Ownership
- •6.1. The nature of ownership
- •6.1.1. The basis of ownership
- •6.1.1.1. Ownership and people
- •6.1.1.2. Ownership and things
- •6.1.2. An outline of the difficulties encountered in any consideration of ownership
- •6.1.2.1. The different meanings of ownership
- •6.1.2.2. Disagreements about ownership
- •6.1.2.3. Contradictions within ownership
- •6.1.2.4. The division of ownership
- •Between different types of owner
- •Between owners and non-owners
- •Notes and Questions 6.1
- •Notes and Questions 6.2
- •6.2. The contents of ownership
- •Notes and Questions 6.3
- •Notes and Questions 6.4
- •6.3. The roles played by ownership
- •6.3.1. As a legal term of art
- •6.3.1.1. Ownership’s role in land
- •6.3.1.2. Ownership’s role in chattels
- •6.3.1.3. Ownership’s role in legislation
- •6.3.2. As an amorphous notion
- •6.3.2.1. Ownership as an organising idea
- •6.3.2.2. Ownership as a contested concept
- •6.4. The limitations of ownership
- •6.4.1. Nuisance
- •6.4.1.1. A brief introduction to nuisance
- •Public nuisance
- •Private nuisance
- •6.4.1.2. The requirements of private nuisance
- •6.4.1.3. Private nuisance and private property
- •What is protected?
- •6.4.1.4. The allocation of entitlements
- •The traditional criteria
- •The role of the market
- •The role of public policy
- •6.4.1.5. The protection of entitlements
- •Property rules
- •Liability rules
- •Rules of inalienability
- •Notes and Questions 6.5
- •Notes and Questions 6.6
- •Notes and Questions 6.7
- •Notes and Questions 6.8
- •Notes and Questions 6.9
- •A. Property and liability rules
- •B. Inalienable entitlements
- •Notes and Questions 6.10
- •6.5. Restrictive covenants
- •Notes and Questions 6.11
- •Notes and Questions 6.12
- •7 Possession
- •7.1. The nature of possession
- •7.1.1. Introduction
- •7.1.2. Possession, ownership and proprietary interests
- •7.1.3. What is possession?
- •7.1.3.1. Factual control
- •The relevance of title
- •The nature of the thing possessed
- •The purpose for which the thing is used
- •Control through agents and control of contents
- •7.1.3.2. Intention required
- •Intention to exclude
- •Effect of ignorance
- •Notes and Questions 7.1
- •7.2. Possession of land
- •7.2.1. Leases and licences
- •7.2.1.1. Why the distinction matters
- •7.2.1.2. Distinguishing leases from licences
- •Notes and Questions 7.2
- •7.2.2. Possession and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.1. General and particular use rights
- •7.2.2.2. Compatibility of particular and general use rights
- •7.3. Possession of goods: bailment
- •7.3.1. Nature of bailment
- •7.3.2. Rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee
- •7.4. Protection of possession
- •7.4.1. Protection of property rights by protection of possession
- •7.4.2. Tort and the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.1. The role of tort in the protection of property rights
- •7.4.2.2. Scope of the property torts
- •Conversion
- •What amounts to a conversion of goods?
- •Remedies
- •Trespass
- •What amounts to trespass
- •Remedies
- •7.4.3. Self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.1. Survival of self-help remedies
- •7.4.3.2. Restrictions and deterrents
- •7.4.4. Unlawful eviction and harassment
- •7.4.5. Trespassing and the criminal law
- •Notes and Questions 7.3
- •8 Fragmentation of ownership
- •8.1. Introduction
- •8.2. Present and future interests
- •8.2.1. Interests in possession, in reversion and in remainder
- •8.2.2. Absolute entitlements, contingent entitlements and mere expectancies
- •8.2.2.1. Absolute entitlements
- •8.2.2.2. Contingent interests and expectancies
- •8.2.2.3. Alternative contingencies
- •8.2.3. When interests vest
- •8.2.4. Alienation, management and control
- •8.2.5. Interests of contingent duration
- •8.2.5.1. Determinable interests
- •8.2.5.2. Interests subject to a condition subsequent
- •8.2.5.3. Distinguishing determinable and forfeitable interests
- •8.2.6. Requirement of certainty
- •8.2.7. Successive interests in land and the doctrine of tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.1. Tenures and estates
- •8.2.7.2. Estates in particular use rights
- •8.2.7.3. Leases
- •8.2.8. Restrictions on the power to create future interests
- •8.3. Legal and equitable interests
- •8.3.1. Origin of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.1.1. Failed formality interests
- •8.3.1.2. Novel interests
- •8.3.2. Legal and equitable interests now
- •8.3.2.1. Interests in land
- •8.3.2.2. Interests in goods
- •8.3.3. The significance of the legal/equitable distinction
- •8.3.4. Three common fallacies
- •8.3.4.1. Equitable interests and beneficial interests
- •8.3.4.2. Over-identification of equitable interests with trusts
- •8.3.4.3. Absolute ownership does not include equitable beneficial ownership
- •Notes and Questions 8.1
- •8.4. Fragmentation of management, control and benefit
- •8.4.1. Corporate property holding
- •8.4.2. Managerial property holding
- •8.4.2.1. Trust
- •The trustee
- •The settlor
- •The beneficiaries
- •8.4.2.2. Administration of property on death
- •8.4.2.3. Bankruptcy and liquidation
- •Notes and Questions 8.2
- •8.5. Group ownership
- •8.6. General and particular use rights
- •Notes and Questions 8.3
- •9 Recognition of new property interests
- •9.1. Why are certain interests regarded as property?
- •9.1.1. The function of property
- •9.1.1.1. As a means of allocating scarce resources
- •9.1.1.2. As an incentive to promote their management
- •9.1.1.3. As a moral, philosophical or political statement
- •9.1.2. The danger of property
- •9.1.3. The requirements of property
- •9.2. The dynamic nature of property
- •9.2.1. The recognition and limits of the covenant as a proprietary interest
- •Notes and Questions 9.1
- •9.2.2. The recognition of a proprietary right to occupy the matrimonial home
- •Notes and Questions 9.2
- •9.3. The general reluctance to recognise new property rights
- •9.3.1. The facts of Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor
- •9.3.2. The views of the majority
- •9.3.3. The views of the minority
- •9.3.4. The significance of the case
- •Notes and Questions 9.3
- •9.4. A comparative confirmation and an economic critique
- •Notes and Questions 9.4
- •9.5. The future of property
- •9.5.1. The new property thesis
- •Notes and Questions 9.5
- •Notes and Questions 9.6
- •10 Title
- •10.1. What we mean by ‘title’
- •10.2. Acquiring title: derivative and original acquisition of title
- •10.2.1. Derivative acquisition: disposition or grant
- •10.2.2. Original acquisition
- •10.3. Relativity of title
- •10.4. Proving title
- •10.4.1. Role of registration
- •10.4.2. Possession as a root of title
- •10.4.3. Provenance
- •10.4.4. Extinguishing title by limitation of action rules
- •10.4.5. Relativity of title and the ius tertii
- •10.5. The nemo dat rule
- •10.5.1. Scope of the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2. General principles applicable to all property
- •10.5.2.1. Registration and the nemo dat rule
- •10.5.2.2. Dispositions to volunteers
- •10.5.2.3. Powers of sale
- •10.5.3. The application of the nemo dat rule to goods
- •10.5.4. The application of the nemo dat rule to money
- •10.5.5. The application of the nemo dat rule to land
- •10.5.5.1. The general principle
- •10.5.5.2. After-acquired property
- •10.5.5.3. Interests by estoppel
- •10.6. Legal and equitable title
- •11 Acquiring title by possession
- •11.1. Introduction
- •11.2. The operation of adverse possession rules
- •11.2.1. Unregistered land
- •11.2.2. Registered land
- •11.2.3. What counts as ‘adverse’ possession
- •11.2.4. Effect on third party interests
- •11.3. Why established possession should defeat the paper owner
- •11.4. Adverse possession and registration
- •11.5. Good faith and the adverse possessor
- •1. Tension between principle and proof
- •Notes and Questions 11.1
- •A. Lockean entitlement
- •B. Utilitarianism
- •C. Property and personhood
- •B. Property theory and adverse possession
- •Notes and Questions 11.2
- •Notes and Questions 11.3
- •Stale claims in registered land
- •Stale claims under the 2002 Act
- •Distinguishing the ‘good’ squatter from the ‘bad’ squatter
- •Problems of proof
- •Effect of the 2002 Act changes on the incidence of adverse possession
- •The incompatibility argument
- •Notes and Questions 11.4
- •11.6. Goods
- •11.6.1. Taking and theft
- •11.6.2. Protection of title by tort
- •11.6.3. The Limitation Act 1980 and title to goods
- •11.6.4. Finders
- •Notes and Questions 11.5
- •12 Transfer and grant
- •12.1. Derivative acquisition
- •12.2. Formalities
- •12.2.1. Nature and content of formalities rules
- •12.2.2. Registration and electronic transactions
- •12.2.3. Validity and enforceability against third parties
- •12.2.4. Effect of compliance on passing of title
- •12.2.5. Transactions excepted from formalities rules
- •12.2.5.1. Equitable modification of legal rules
- •12.2.5.2. Implied rights
- •12.2.5.3. Rights acquired by possession or prescription
- •12.2.6. Deeds and prescribed forms
- •12.2.7. Why have formalities rules
- •12.2.7.1. The evidentiary function
- •12.2.7.2. The cautionary function
- •12.2.7.3. The channelling function
- •12.2.7.4. Other functions
- •Clarifying terms
- •Publicity
- •State functions
- •12.2.8. Disadvantages
- •12.2.8.1. Hard cases
- •12.2.8.2. Costs
- •Notes and Questions 12.1
- •Notes and Questions 12.2
- •12.3. Contractual rights to property interests
- •12.3.1. Estate contracts and the rule in Walsh v. Lonsdale
- •12.3.2. Application to property other than land
- •12.3.3. The failed formalities rule
- •12.3.3.1. The general rule
- •12.3.3.2. The failed formalities rule as it applies to land
- •12.3.3.3. Failed formalities rule as it applies to other property
- •Notes and Questions 12.3
- •Notes and Questions 12.4
- •12.3.4. Options to purchase, rights of pre-emption and rights of first refusal
- •Notes and Questions 12.5
- •Notes and Questions 12.6
- •12.4. Unascertained property
- •12.4.1. The problem of identification
- •12.4.2. Unascertained goods
- •12.4.3. Other unascertained property
- •Notes and Questions 12.7
- •13 Acquiring interests by other methods
- •13.1. Introduction
- •13.2. The difference between adverse possession and prescription
- •13.3. Why long use should give rise to entitlement
- •13.4. Rationale
- •13.4.1. Ascendancy of the presumed grant rationale
- •13.4.2. Effect of the ‘revolting fiction’
- •13.5. When long use gives rise to a prescriptive right
- •13.5.1. The problem of negative uses
- •13.5.2. Rights that can be granted but not acquired by prescription
- •13.6. User as of right and the problem of acquiescence
- •13.7. The future of prescription
- •Recommendation in favour of abolition
- •Minority view in favour of retention
- •Notes and Questions 13.1
- •14 Enforceability and priority of interests
- •14.1. Rationale of enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2. Enforceability and priority rules
- •14.2.1. The basic rules
- •14.2.2. Impact of registration
- •Notes and Questions 14.1
- •14.3. The doctrine of notice
- •14.3.1. Notice
- •14.3.2. Good faith
- •14.3.3. Effectiveness of the doctrine of notice as an enforceability rule
- •Notes and Questions 14.2
- •14.4. Overreaching
- •14.4.1. Nature and scope of overreaching
- •14.4.2. Operation of overreaching
- •14.4.3. Overreaching the interests of occupying beneficiaries
- •14.4.4. Transactions capable of overreaching beneficiaries’ interests
- •14.4.5. The two-trustees rule
- •Introductory
- •Overreaching
- •Safeguard for beneficiaries
- •Change of circumstances
- •Protecting occupation of property
- •Principal recommendation
- •Notes and Questions 14.3
- •15 Registration
- •15.1. What are registration systems for?
- •15.2. Characteristics of the English land registration system
- •15.2.1. Privacy
- •15.2.2. Comprehensiveness
- •15.2.3. Boundaries
- •15.2.4. Restricted class of registrable interests
- •15.2.4.1. Distinguishing ‘substantive’ registration and ‘protection’ on the register
- •15.2.4.2. Registration
- •15.2.4.3. ‘Protection’ by notice or restriction
- •15.2.4.4. The overriding interest class
- •15.2.5. The mirror, curtain and guarantee principles
- •THE ‘MIRROR PRINCIPLE’
- •THE ‘CURTAIN PRINCIPLE’
- •15.2.6. Consequences of non-registration
- •Notes and Questions 15.1
- •Compulsory use of electronic conveyancing
- •Do-it-yourself conveyancing
- •The objective of the power
- •The application of the power
- •Notes and Questions 15.2
- •15.3. Enforceability and priority of interests under the Land Registration Act 2002
- •15.3.1. Registrable interests
- •15.3.2. All other interests
- •15.3.2.1. Enforceability
- •15.3.2.2. Priority
- •15.4. Overriding interests
- •15.4.1. Justifications for overriding interests
- •15.4.2. Principles to be applied
- •15.4.3. Overriding interests under the 2002 Act
- •15.4.4. Easements and profits
- •15.4.5. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 1925 Act
- •15.4.5.1. What rights are covered?
- •5.4.5.2. Actual occupation
- •Physical presence
- •Personal occupation
- •Non-residential premises
- •15.4.6. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 2002 Act
- •15.4.6.1. Causal link between interest and occupation
- •15.4.6.2. Meaning of ‘actual occupation’
- •15.4.6.3. The ‘notice’ element
- •15.4.6.4. Can minors be in actual occupation?
- •15.4.6.5. Occupation of part
- •15.4.7. Complexity
- •Notes and Questions 15.3
- •15.5. Indemnity
- •15.5.1. Function of indemnity
- •15.5.2. Shortfall in the provision of indemnity
- •15.5.3. Cost
- •17 Leases and bailment
- •17.1. Introduction
- •17.2. Leases and bailments compared
- •17.2.1. Consensuality
- •17.2.2. Contract
- •17.2.3. Enforcement
- •17.2.4. Duration and purpose
- •17.2.5. Beneficial use
- •17.2.6. Proprietary status
- •17.2.7. Inherent obligations of the possessor
- •17.3. Leases
- •17.3.1. Nature of the lease
- •17.3.1.1. Duration: the four basic categories
- •The legal position
- •Length of fixed-term leases in practice
- •Commonhold as an alternative to the long residential lease
- •Commercial premises
- •Assignment and premature termination of fixed-term lease
- •17.3.1.3. Periodic tenancies
- •Nature
- •Contractual fetters on notice to quit
- •17.3.1.4. Tenancy at will
- •Tenancy at sufferance
- •Notes and Questions 17.1
- •17.3.1.5. Certainty of duration
- •Notes and Questions 17.2
- •Passage 2
- •Passage 3
- •Passage 4
- •Notes and Questions 17.3
- •17.3.1.7. The tolerated trespasser status
- •Notes and Questions 17.4
- •Notes and Questions 17.5
- •17.3.2. Alienability
- •17.3.2.1. Inherent alienability
- •Alienability of tenant’s interest
- •Subleases and other derivative interests granted by the tenant
- •Effect of termination of lease on derivative interests
- •Alienability of landlord’s interest
- •Concurrent leases and other derivative interests granted by the landlord
- •17.3.2.2. Restrictions on alienability
- •17.3.2.3. Statutory control of contractual restrictions
- •Notes and Questions 17.6
- •17.3.3. Effect of alienation on enforceability
- •17.3.3.1. Introduction: the basic principle
- •Automatic transmission of benefit and burden of proprietary terms: the privity of estate principle
- •Post-assignment liability: the privity of contract principle
- •17.3.3.3. Derivative interest holders
- •17.4. Bailment
- •17.4.1. Essential features of bailment
- •17.4.2. Categories of bailment
- •17.4.3. Characteristics of bailment
- •17.4.4. Liabilities of the bailee
- •Notes and Questions 17.7
- •17.4.5. Is bailment proprietary?
- •17.4.5.1. Possession and exclusivity
- •17.4.5.2. Alienability
- •17.4.5.3. Enforceability against third parties
- •17.4.5.4. Other proprietary indicia
- •18 Security interests
- •18.1. The nature and function of security
- •18.1.1. Nature of security
- •18.1.1.1. Terminology problems
- •18.1.1.2. Legal and equitable rights to redeem
- •18.1.1.3. Creation, attachment and perfection of security
- •18.1.2. Function
- •18.1.2.1. Right of first recourse
- •18.1.2.2. Attachment to the asset
- •18.1.2.4. The hostage function
- •18.1.2.5. Signalling, monitoring and control
- •18.1.3. Efficiency
- •18.1.4. Use of security
- •18.2. Forms of security
- •18.2.1. Property transfer securities: the mortgage
- •18.2.2. Possessory securities: pledge or pawn
- •18.2.3. Hypothecations: the charge
- •18.2.4. Liens
- •18.2.5. Property retention securities
- •18.2.6. Charge by way of legal mortgage
- •Notes and Questions 18.1
- •18.3. Control over the terms of the relationship
- •18.3.1. Equitable supervisory jurisdiction
- •18.3.2. The Kreglinger principles
- •18.3.3. Statutory intervention
- •Notes and Questions 18.2
- •18.4. Enforcement of security
- •18.4.1. Remedies
- •18.4.2. Possession
- •18.4.3. Sale
- •18.4.3.1. When the power arises
- •18.4.3.2. When the power becomes exercisable
- •18.4.4. Duties on enforcement
- •General principles
- •The handling of arrears: initial action taken by lenders
- •Alleviating arrears problems
- •The levying of charges on accounts in arrear
- •Methods of obtaining possession
- •Proceeds of sale
- •Indemnity insurance
- •Loss recovery procedures
- •Notes and Questions 18.3
- •16 Co-ownership
- •16.1. Introduction
- •16.2.1. Basic concepts
- •OWNERSHIP IN COMMON
- •JOINT OWNERSHIP
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN FINANCIAL ASSETS
- •CONCURRENT INTERESTS IN LAND
- •Notes and Questions 16.1
- •Unity of possession
- •Unity of interest
- •Unity of title
- •Unity of time
- •16.2.2. A comparison of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
- •16.2.2.1. Four unities versus one
- •Notes and Questions 16.2
- •16.2.2.2. The right of survivorship (and how to avoid it)
- •Severance at common law
- •16.2.2.3. Acting upon one’s share
- •16.2.2.4. Mutual agreement
- •16.2.2.5. Mutual conduct
- •16.2.2.6. Statutory severance
- •Notes and Questions 16.3
- •16.2.3. Use of co-owned property
- •16.2.3.1. Land
- •12 THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •13 EXCLUSION AND RESTRICTION OF RIGHT TO OCCUPY
- •Notes and Questions 16.4
- •16.2.3.2. Chattels
- •Notes and Questions 16.5
- •16.2.4. Sale and other dispositions of co-owned property
- •16.2.4.1. Land
- •Notes and Questions 16.6
- •16.2.4.2. Chattels
- •16.3. Other forms of co-ownership
- •16.3.1. Commonhold
- •16.3.2. Unincorporated associations
- •Notes and Questions 16.7
- •16.3.3. Extending the limits of co-ownership: public trusts
- •Bibliography
- •Index
Justifications for property rights 81
economic optimific effects of private ownership is indeed relevant to the overall moral justification of autonomous ownership as an alternative form of ownership.
There is another difficulty in measuring the justifiability of any particular form of property, also identified by Grunebaum. He makes the point that, while the consequences of practicing a particular form of ownership are clearly relevant in assessing its moral justifiability, in practice it is extremely difficult to discern what those consequences are – a point that could be made with equal force in relation to the assessment of economic efficiency. As he says (Grunebaum, Private Ownership, p. 8):
Specific forms only have tendencies to produce certain consequences ‘all else being equal’. In actuality all else is rarely equal and consequences which are elicited in support of conclusions about the practice of a specific form of ownership may be, and sometimes are, explainable by social forces which have little relevance to the society’s specific form of ownership. For example, it is claimed that private ownership of the means of production causes increasing concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few. While this may seem plausible it is in fact difficult to prove because countervailing forces such as labor unions, progressive income tax measures, and capitalization by issuing common stock, among other forces, have exerted pressures in the opposite direction. Actual statistics about wealth distribution may by themselves be irrelevant to proving or disproving the claim. This does not mean that moral justification is impossible. What is implied is that any justification which depends upon predictions about what the consequences will be of practicing a specific form must also discuss other social forces which may affect its tendencies.
3.3. John Locke’s justification for private property
3.3.1. What Locke was attempting to establish
Jean Jacques Rousseau said in A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality:
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders, how much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: ‘Beware of listening to this impostor. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no one.’
John Locke’s concern is to demonstrate that this is wrong, and to establish that, given the right conditions, it is morally justifiable that those who take resources from their natural state are allowed to keep them for themselves to the exclusion of all others. He is therefore seeking to justify original acquisition of private property rights. He does not deal with transfer of property rights, nor (except incidentally)
82Property Law
with questions of redistribution of property rights once resources have already become subject to some form of ownership, whether private or otherwise.
3.3.2. The political context
Locke’s argument about original acquisition of property rights was part of a highly charged political debate that was taking place in seventeenth-century England about the legitimacy of private rights as against an absolutist monarchy, and his antagonists in the debate had political views that were very different from those expressed by Rousseau, who was writing some fifty years after Locke’s death. What Locke is saying is important to us now irrespective of its historical political context, but it makes it easier to follow what he is saying if we have some idea of the arguments he was trying to meet.
Those who supported absolutist monarchy (most notably, Sir Robert Filmer) disputed the notion, held by Locke and other natural lawyers, that private property rights and other private rights had a legitimacy which was not derived from the state. As far as natural lawyers were concerned, the world was given to people in common by God for their subsistence and preservation (or, as Locke says in paragraph 26, ‘God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the support and comfort of their being.’). It is from this, they argue, that private property owners derive their rights: private ownership is acquired by individuals taking for themselves things given to ‘mankind in common’ by God. Consequently, natural lawyers argued (and indeed might still argue), any right that the state has to interfere with private property rights is conferred on the state by the people and can be withdrawn by the people if abused by the state. Such arguments were used to justify the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688 and in support of the French Revolution and the American War of Independence.
Filmer, in common with other supporters of absolutist monarchies and the divine right of kings, rejected this analysis. Filmer traced the derivation of property rights from God to Adam, the first man, and from him by a direct line of descent through his heirs to the monarch, regarded as Adam’s only legitimate heir, the inheritor of the dominion over the world and all its resources which God gave to Adam. According to this view, such private property rights as individuals held, they held only by grace of the monarch, who could withdraw them at will. This is the argument Locke is referring to in paragraph 25 when he says that ‘if it be difficult to make out ‘‘property’’ upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common [i.e. to all people in common], [then] it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any ‘‘property’’ upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity’.
Justifications for property rights 83
3.3.3. The problem of consent
Filmer argued that the natural lawyers’ analysis of the derivation of property rights was fatally flawed because it failed to explain how private property owners could legitimately have acquired rights from mankind in common. If one person acquires private property rights in a thing that was formerly held by all people in common, this necessarily extinguishes the right or liberty that those people had in the thing. How can this be justified? Earlier natural lawyers, most notably Grotius and Pufendorf, had argued that it was done by the consent of the commoners. Filmer rejected this as an absurdity:
Certainly, it was a rare felicity, that all men in the world at one instant of time should agree together in one mind to change the natural community of all things into private dominion: for without such a unanimous consent it was not possible for community to be altered: for if but one man in the world had dissented, the alteration had been unjust, because that man by the law of nature had a right to the common use of all things in the world; so that, to have given a propriety of any one thing to any other, had been to have robbed him of his right to the common use of all things. (Filmer, ‘Observations’, in Patriarcha, p. 273)
In Extract 3.5 below, Locke is seeking to defend the natural law position against this attack. He does not do so by defending the consent theory (although, as others have pointed out, it is considerably more sophisticated and plausible than Filmer suggests: see, for example, Stephen Buckle’s discussion of Grotius’ formulation of the consent theory, and Filmer’s misconception of it, in Natural Law and the Theory of Property, pp. 161–7). Instead, Locke argues that it is not necessary to look for consent from the commoners, because it is something else that confers legitimacy on the holding of a person who takes resources from the common. His argument is that those who take resources from the common for themselves to the exclusion of all others legitimately acquire rights over the resource if by so doing they mixed their labour with it.
3.3.4. Locke’s justification for original acquisition
This argument of Locke’s amounts to more than a ‘first come, first served’ justification. Awarding property rights to the first taker has considerable attractions, as we see in the next chapter, but this is not what Locke is advocating or defending. He argues that the first taker of a thing from the common legitimately acquires rights not because he was first, but because, and if and only if, he mixed his labour with the thing he takes. However, he argues, there are two provisos or qualifications to this general principle. The first is that no one is justified in taking more than he needs, so that the surplus spoils (sometimes referred to as ‘the spoilation proviso’). The second is that such an appropriation from the commons is justifiable only when ‘enough and as good [is] left in common for others’ (the ‘sufficiency proviso’).
84 Property Law
The precise scope and significance of these two provisos is unclear (and controversial) but before looking at them more closely we need to clarify Locke’s basic premise and then outline the steps in the reasoning by which he arrives at his general principle.
3.3.5. The nature of Locke’s commons
Locke talks about the world and its resources being given to mankind ‘in common’. Does he mean by this that unallocated natural resources are open access communal property (i.e. resources which everyone has a Hohfeldian claim-right not to be excluded from) or that they are no-property (i.e. resources which everyone has only a Hohfeldian privilege to use, but no right not to be excluded from)? This has always been a highly controversial question, if only because of the political implications of resting Locke’s theory in particular and natural law theory in general on an apparent assumption of natural communism. In fact, it is not at all clear what Locke meant: compare the different ways in which Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property, pp. 108–9, Waldron, The Right to Private Property, pp. 148–57, Tully, A Discourse on Property, pp. 59–64, 95–8 and 124–5, Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property, pp. 164–5 and 183–90, Ryan, Property and Political Theory, pp. 29–32, and Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property, pp. 26–9 and 140–5, interpret what Locke actually says on this point. This is not an issue we need to explore here, because the justification problem is essentially the same whether private property robs others of a right not to be excluded from the appropriated resources or just a liberty to use it. As Waldron says, it may be that it requires stronger justification to extinguish a Hohfeldian claim-right in a thing than a Hohfeldian liberty in it, but even this is doubtful if the thing in question provided the basic means of support for the former users. So, for the purposes of the following discussion, we assume that what requires justification is an appropriation of a thing which removes everyone else’s right not to be excluded from that thing or their privilege to use and enjoy it for their own self-preservation.
3.3.6. Why mixing labour with a thing should give rise to entitlement
Locke summarises his argument at paragraph 27. His starting point is that we each have ‘property’ in our own ‘person’ (the quotation marks are his), in the sense that no one but ourselves has any rights in it. In the same way, he says, the labour of our bodies and the work of our hands is also our own. When we remove something from its natural state by mixing our labour with it, we are joining something of our own to it. By doing this, we make it our own property. He goes on to elaborate the argument, and adds the two provisos (the sufficiency proviso first appearing at the end of paragraph 27 and the spoilation proviso at paragraph 31).
There are obvious problems with this reasoning. We noted in Chapter 1 that the question of whether we own our own bodies is not straightforward, so it may well
Justifications for property rights 85
be necessary to look more closely at the first assumption in Locke’s argument, that we each have property in our own bodies. But, even if we accept this first step in the argument, and also accept that our labour is our ‘property’ in any relevant sense (and there are difficulties with this too), why should the mixing of it with a thing make that thing our property also? Locke gives a number of reasons, which we can take as cumulative or alternative.
His first point (paragraphs 28–30) is that, if we pick an apple from an apple tree growing wild and eat it, everyone must accept that the apple becomes our exclusive property at some point in the process, whether when we pick it, or first bite into it, or finish digesting it. There must be some reason for this intuitive acceptance of appropriation from the common that we all have, he says. It cannot be because everyone has consented to the appropriation, because if everyone’s consent was required to every appropriation we would all starve (this is essentially Filmer’s point). However, if it isn’t common consent that provides the justification, he says, it must be something else, and the only other thing it can be is the labour expended on the picking of the apple. This is the only thing that adds something to what nature has provided, the only thing that distinguishes this apple from all the other common apples.
This argument does not really take us anywhere on its own. It starts by begging the question, by assuming to be correct (‘nobody can deny but’ the apple becomes the property of the person who picks and eats it) the very thing that Locke is trying to prove (that unallocated resources properly become the private property of those who appropriate them). It then asserts, rather than demonstrates, that the labour involved in the picking is the only thing that could justify allocating the apple to the picker. He does not consider other possibilities: why not say, for example, that it is justifiable to allocate the apple to the picker because apple-picking is the first step towards apple-eating, which represents using the apple for the purpose for which Locke would say God provided it?
However, while this argument does not tell us why mixing our labour with a thing should give us property rights in it, there appears within it a reference to a more substantial argument that Locke develops later on. This is that, until we mix our labour with it, ‘the common is of no use’ (paragraph 28).
Locke develops this argument more fully in paragraphs 40–4. Locke’s point here is that, by mixing our labour with things, we make them more valuable. Natural resources are of little use to us until we have exploited their potential by labouring on them, and if we look at the things that are valuable and useful to us we will find that 90 per cent of their value (later he increases the proportion to 99 per cent) is attributable to the labour that went into producing them. Robert Nozick points out a number of difficulties with this (see Extract 3.6 below). Apart from anything else, we do not always increase the value of things by working on them, and, even if we did, why should this give us exclusive ownership of the whole thing rather than a share in it proportionate to the increase in value? These objections can be met, to some extent at least. If we accept that the full potential
86Property Law
use and value of natural resources should be realised, most people would agree that this can only be achieved by individuals labouring on them. Allocating outright ownership to the labourer (regardless of the actual effect on value in each particular case) is an obviously simple and effective incentive and/or reward and/or compensation for the expenditure of the necessary labour. This can be put in religious terms, as Locke does: God provided mankind with natural resources so that people would work to improve them to produce sustenance to preserve their lives, labour being a virtue in itself, and private property being both the reward and the compensation for the expenditure of labour and the means by which God intended natural resources to be developed so that they could sustain humans. Alternatively, we can put it in economic terms: natural resources can be exploited to their fullest extent only by people working on them, and people will choose to undertake the necessary work if they are rewarded by the allocation of private property in whatever is produced by their work. If we rewarded only successful work and only to the extent that it was successful – i.e. labour that did in fact end up increasing the value of things, and then only up to the increase in value – we would discourage innovative work and inhibit development. No one would experiment with new ways of preserving or using timber, for example, if they knew that they would be allowed to keep the end product only if and to the extent that the experiment was successful. Also, allocating property rights in this way would require a costly bureaucracy. It would be necessary for the state, or some other official body, to judge who had ‘earned’ what property rights in what things in every case: someone would have to decide whether you increased the value of the plank by painting it pink (judged by what standard?) and if so whether to a sufficient degree to be allowed to keep it, or just to use it for a limited period of time. This would not just be costly. It would also introduce a degree of day-to-day bureaucratic intervention into the allocation of private property rights that most libertarians would find repugnant. A clear simple rule that labouring on a thing always and automatically allows you to take the thing laboured on avoids these difficulties, and arguably this outweighs the disadvantage that this will result in occasionally rewarding disimprovers.
However, this argument works least well in relation to Locke’s prime example of land. To reward labour that increases the productivity of the land (the crops, timber, minerals etc. that Locke refers to in paragraph 43) with perpetual ownership of the land seems disproportionate in principle. Why not just ownership of the produce, plus guaranteed use of the land for a period sufficient to enable the produce to be harvested, or alternatively for so long as the land continues to be put to productive use? This does not seem a particularly difficult rule to apply, and it would have the significant advantage of leaving future generations with the opportunity to gain land rights by original acquisition. As John Stuart Mill says (in the course of an argument that land ownership ought to continue only for so long as the owner of the land is its ‘improver’):
- #
- #
- #
- #
- #
- #
- #
- #13.12.20224.1 Кб8._!!The Property Platform in Anglo-American Law and the Primacy of the Property Concept.pdf
- #13.12.20224.1 Кб8._(Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law) Stephen R. Munzer-New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property -Cambridge University Press (2007).pdf
- #13.12.20224.1 Кб2._(Critical Approaches to Law) Margaret Davies-Property_ Meanings, Histories, Theories-Routledge-Cavendish (2007).pdf