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(Law in Context) Alison Clarke, Paul Kohler-Property Law_ Commentary and Materials (Law in Context)-Cambridge University Press (2006).pdf
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558Property Law

be required to pass the discoverability test if the person entitled to it ‘proves that it has been exercised in the period of one year ending with the day of the disposition’ (paragraph 3(2)).

There are several difficulties with all this. It not only reintroduces the idea of notice into land registration (so reintroducing the very problems that registration is designed to overcome, as we saw in Chapter 14), it produces it in a form that is quite different from (and not apparently superior to) the traditional concept of actual/constructive/imputed notice we considered in Chapter 14. What, for example, is to be the role of imputed notice here? Can it really be intended that an ‘undiscoverable’ easement or profit will be enforceable against a purchaser if she actually knows about it, but not if her solicitor and surveyor know about it but omit to tell her? And what is the justification for protecting discoverable but not undiscoverable easements? The latter could include rights over drainage, water and power conduits that are essential for the reasonable use of the benefited land but that even the holder of the easement does not realise she has. It is difficult to see why the burden of such rights should not pass automatically with the burdened land regardless of registration, and it is surely an unnecessary complication to require the easement holder to prove use within the year before the disposition.

But the most important objection to the introduction of this discoverability test is that it is based on the doubtful premise that the two conflicting principles adopted by the Law Commission in its Third Report on Land Registration (that purchasers should take free from interests not on the register, but vulnerable interest holders should be protected) can best be resolved by limiting both the immunity of the purchaser and the protection of the prior-interest holder by factors relating to the purchaser rather than factors relating to the prior-interest holder. This seems hard on both. As far as prior-interest holders are concerned, a person who cannot reasonably be expected to protect her interest on the register is no less in that position simply because her interest is undiscoverable. As to purchasers, their claim to take free from interests not appearing on the register is not based on justice but on practicalities – this is the best way of ensuring that trading in interests in land is fast, inexpensive and straightforward. If a purchaser’s protection depends in every case on a minute enquiry into what he knew or should have discovered, the object is defeated.

15.4.5. Interests of persons in actual occupation: the 1925 Act

All these arguments apply, and with even greater force, to this category of overriding interest. The 2002 Act formulation of the category is considerably more complex than its 1925 Act equivalent, but it retains two crucial elements from the 1925 Act formulation, so making it necessary to understand both.

In the Land Registration Act 1925, the equivalent category was set out in section 70(1)(g):

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(1) All registered land shall . . . be deemed to be subject to such of the following overriding interests as may be for the time being subsisting in reference thereto . . .

(that is to say) –

. . .

(g) The rights of every person in actual occupation of the land or in receipt of the rents and profits thereof, save where enquiry is made of such person and the rights are not disclosed.

The House of Lords decision in Williams and Glyn’s Bank v. Boland [1981] AC 487 (see Notes and Questions 15.3 below) established two important points about this, both of which continue to be relevant in the 2002 Act formulation. The first concerns the scope of the rights which will be overriding if the right holder is in occupation. The second is the meaning of ‘actual occupation’.

15.4.5.1. What rights are covered?

It was accepted in Webb v. Pollmount Ltd [1966] Ch 584 (and never subsequently doubted) that all proprietary interests in land are overriding if the right holder is in occupation of the land, not just those where there is some causal connection between the interest and the occupation. A causal connection between the two would exist where it is the interest that entitles the occupier to be in occupation: this would cover for example tenants, or those with interests under a trust, or contractual purchasers allowed into possession even though the purchase was never completed, like Mrs Carrick in Lloyds Bank v. Carrick [1996] 2 All ER 630 (see Notes and Questions 12.2 above). Equally, a causal connection would exist where it is the occupation – in the form of possession – that gave rise to the right, which would cover those who have acquired title by taking possession. It is consistent with the second principle stated in the Law Commission’s Third Report on Land Registration that all these people should be protected, because significant numbers of them fall within the category of persons who could not reasonably be expected to register their interest. Their case is made stronger by the fact that they will tend to value their interest as thing rather than wealth (adopting Rudden’s terminology, as discussed in Extract 2.3 above). Because the right to occupy the land is associated with their interest in the land, they almost certainly put the value of their interest higher than its monetary value.

None of this applies when there is no causal connection between the occupation and the right. Why should, for example, a mortgage or an easement over land, or an option to purchase it, be enforceable simply because the holder of the interest happens also to occupy the land? These are not interests that usually arise informally, and there seems no reason why they should be put in the overriding interest category.

However, the House of Lords has confirmed that no causal connection is necessary, and there is nothing in the 2002 Act formulation to justify a different conclusion under the 2002 Act.

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