- •Introduction
- •1) Criminal Law and Tort Law Contrasted
- •B. The origins of canadian tort law
- •1) The Nature of the Defendant's Conduct
- •2) The Nature of the Plaintiff's Loss
- •D. The objectives of tort law
- •2) The Instrumentalist View
- •I) Specific Deterrence
- •II) General Deterrence
- •III) Market Deterrence
- •E. Personal injury, tort law, and other compensatory vehicles
- •1) Governmental Initiatives
- •2) Private Sector First-Party Insurance
- •F. The organization of tort law
- •A. Introduction
- •1) Application of the Standard of Care
- •I) Judicial Policy
- •2) Special Standards of Care
- •3) Proof of Negligence: Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
- •1) Cause-in-Fact
- •4) Market Share Liability
- •5) Loss of a Chance
- •6) Multiple Tortfeasors Causing Indivisible Damage
- •D. Damage
- •E. The duty of care
- •1) The Foreseeable Plaintiff (The First Branch of the Anns Test)
- •2) Policy Considerations (The Second Branch of the Anns Test)
- •The Supreme Court decision in Galaske V. O'Donnell [Note 123:
- •In its recent decision in Ryan V. Victoria (City) [Note 126:
- •F. Remoteness of damage
- •1) The Foreseeability Rule
- •G. Defences
- •1) Contributory Negligence
- •2) Voluntary Assumption of Risk (Volenti Non Fit Injuria)
- •3) Illegality (Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio)
- •4) Inevitable Accident
- •H. Remedies
- •1) Personal Injury
- •I) The Impact of the Trilogy
- •2) Death
- •3) Property Damage
- •A. Introduction
- •B. Products liability
- •1) Manufacturing Defects
- •2) The Duty to Warn
- •3) Reasonable Care in Design
- •1) The Duty of Care
- •2) The Standard of Care
- •D. Human reproduction
- •1) Prenatal Injuries
- •2) Wrongful Birth
- •3) Wrongful Life
- •4) Wrongful Pregnancy
- •E. Occupiers' liability
- •1) The Classical Common Law of Occupiers' Liability
- •2) The Modern Common Law of Occupiers' Liability
- •3) Legislative Reform
- •F. Breach of statutory duty
- •G. Pure economic loss
- •I) Foreseeable Reliance/Reasonable Reliance : The Prima Facie Duty of Care
- •II) Policy Concerns: The Issue of Indeterminacy
- •2) Negligent Performance of a Service
- •3) Relational Economic Loss
- •I) Contractual Relational Economic Loss
- •4) Product Quality Claims
- •H. Governmental liability
- •2) Negligence
- •In Rondel the House of Lords provided a number of reasons for the immunity. They included:
- •Intentional torts
- •A. Introduction
- •B. The meaning of intention
- •C. Intentional interference with the person
- •1) Battery
- •3) False Imprisonment
- •5) False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution
- •6) Malicious Procurement and Execution of a Search Warrant
- •7) Abuse of Process
- •9) Privacy
- •10) Discrimination
- •12) Harassment
- •13) Defences to the Intentional Interference with the Person
- •III) Defence of a Third Person
- •V) Discipline
- •VI) Necessity
- •VII) Legal Authority
- •VIII) Illegality: Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio
- •II) Contributory Negligence
- •1) Elements of Liability
- •2) Defences to the Intentional Interference with Land
- •3) Remedies
- •4) Trespass to Land and Shopping Malls
- •5) Trespass to Airspace
- •E. Intentional interference with chattels
- •1) Trespass to Chattels
- •3) Conversion
- •4) The Action on the Case to Protect the Owner's Reversionary Interest
- •5) An Illustrative Case: Penfold's Wines Pty. Ltd. V. Elliott
- •6) The Recovery of Chattels
- •F. Intentional interference with economic interests
- •1) Deceptive Practices
- •II) Conspiracy to Injure by Unlawful Means
- •I) Direct Inducement to Breach a Contract
- •II) Indirect Inducement to Breach a Contract
- •Intentional Interference with the Person
- •Barry j. Reiter Melanie a. Shishler
- •1) Elements of Liability
- •2) Defences
- •Barry j. Reiter Melanie a. Shishler
- •1) The Elements of Liability
- •3) Dogs
- •4) The Scienter Action and Negligence
- •Barry j. Reiter Melanie a. Shishler
- •1) Elements of Liability
- •2) Defences
- •Barry j. Reiter Melanie a. Shishler
- •2) Principal and Agent
- •3) Statutory Vicarious Liability
- •4) Independent Contractors
- •In Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) V. British Columbia, [Note 50:
- •5) Liability of the Employee or the Agent
- •Barry j. Reiter Melanie a. Shishler
- •Chap.6 Contents
- •1) Physical Damage to Land
- •2) Interference with Enjoyment and Comfort of Land
- •7) Defences
- •8) Remedies
- •1) The Definition of a Public Nuisance
- •A. Introduction
- •2) Reference to the Plaintiff
- •3) Publication
- •E. Defences
- •2) Privilege
- •3) Fair Comment on a Matter of Public Interest
- •F. Remedies
- •H. The next challenge: political speech
- •A. Introduction
- •1) Contract Law and Tort Law
- •2) Fiduciary Law and Tort Law
- •3) Restitution and Tort Law
- •C. Public law
- •1) The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Tort Law
- •A. The centrality of the tort of negligence
- •B. The dynamism of the tort of negligence
- •C. Generalization and integration
- •D. Reform and modernization
- •E. The triumph of compensation and loss distribution policies
- •Ison, t.G., The Forensic Lottery: a Critique on Tort Liability as a System of Personal Injury Compensation (London: Staples Press, 1967)
- •Intentional conduct of a public official in abuse of her power, or knowingly beyond the scope of her jurisdiction, causing damage to the plaintiff.
- •Preface
- •Philip h. Osborne
III) Defence of a Third Person
There is no appellate authority on the scope of the privilege to use reasonable force to defend a third person from violence or the threat of immediate violence but the defence has been recognized at the trial level. This is not surprising given the general attitude to, and approval of, rescuers. The factors taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the force mirror those considered in determining self- defence. Gambriell v. Caparelli [Note 92: (1974), 7 O.R. (2d) 205 (Co. Ct.).] is an exemplary case. The defendant's son and the plaintiff got into a brawl in a back lane. The defendant, who did not speak English, feared that her son was being choked. The fight ended when she hit the plaintiff over the head with a garden cultivator. In the particular circumstances of the case, more moderate conduct may well have been insufficient to protect her son. The action in battery against her was dismissed.
iv) Defence of Property
In some circumstances the possessor of land may use physical force to protect his property from unlawful entry (trespass) by another. When the unlawful entry is peaceable, the possessor must first request the trespasser to leave the premises. If the trespasser refuses to comply with the request to leave, reasonable force may be used to eject him from the property. The possessor is not required to make a preliminary request that the trespasser leave where the entry is forcible or is such as to create a fear of immediate violence. Force may be used only for the purpose of removing the intruder. If the intruder resists, force may be increased as required to eject the trespasser. Under no circumstances, however, may a possessor use deadly force or deliberately cause serious injury to a trespasser who will not leave the property. The protection of property interests does not warrant causing death or serious injury. The possessor must justify that kind of force on the basis of either self- defence or the defence of a third party.
The law is less clear in respect of injuries caused by mechanical devices and other stratagems designed to protect property and to deter intruders. A thicket of intersecting principles bears on this issue, including the privilege to defend one's property, occupiers'liability rules, rules about the liability for animals such as guard dogs, and the rules about consent, contributory negligence, and illegality. Until this tangle is sorted out by an authoritative court, the best guide is reasonableness. The use of barbed wire, guard dogs, fences with spikes, and stone walls with jagged glass embedded on top will in most cases be regarded as reasonable deterrence, and intruders will not be able to recover for the minor injuries caused by them. The use of punitive or retributive devices such as spring guns, electrically charged wire fences, vicious attack dogs, and other devices that seriously threaten life and limb are normally unreasonable and liability may be imposed. The marginal cases require a careful consideration of all the relevant factors, including the time of day of the intrusion, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the danger and degree of concealment of the protective device, the nature of the land use being protected, the motive of the possessor of the land, and any posted notices warning of the protective system.