!Учебный год 2023-2024 / Economics_of_Crime_and_Punishment_Bibl

Anderson, David A. 1999. ‘The Aggregate Burden of Crime’. Journal of Law and Economics 42(2):611-642.

Andreoni, James. 1991. ‘Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?’. RAND Journal of Economics 22(3):385-395.

Avio, Kenneth L. 2000. ‘8300 The Economics of Prisons’. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (Eds.). 5:394-433. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Baik, Kyung Hwan, and In-Gyu Kim. 2001. ‘Optimal Punishment when Individuals May Learn Deviant Values’. International Review of Law and Economics 21(3):271-285.

Basu, Kaushik, Sudipto Bhattacharya, and Ajit Mishra. 1992. ‘Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption’. Journal of Public Economics 48(3):349-359.

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Louis Kaplow. 1993. ‘Optimal Sanctions and Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection’. International Review of Law and Economics 13(2):217-224.

Becker, Gary S. 1968. ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’. Journal of Political Economy 76(2):169-217.

Becker, Gary S., and George J. Stigler. 1974. ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’. Journal of Legal Studies 3(1):1-18.

Ben-Shahar, Omri. 1997. ‘Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When Individuals Learn the Penalty Only by Committing the Crime’. International Review of Law and Economics 17(3):409-421.

Ben-Shahar, Omri, and Alon Harel. 1995. ‘Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11(2):434-455.

Block, Michael K., and J.M. Heineke. 1975. ‘A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice’. American Economic Review 65(3):314-325.

Bowles, Roger. 2000. ‘8500 Corruption’. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (Eds.). 5:460-491. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bowles, Roger and Nuno Garoupa. 1997. ‘Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime’. International Review of Law and Economics 75-87.

Burnovski, Moshe, and Zvi Safra. 1994. ‘Deterrence Effects of Sequential Punishment Policies: Should Repeat Offenders be More Severely Punished?’. International Review of Law and Economics 14(3):341-350.

Cameron, Samuel. 1988. ‘The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence’. Kyklos 41(2):301-323.

Chang, Juin-jen, Ching-chong Lai, and C. C. Yang. 2000. ‘Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime: Further Results’. International Review of Law and Economics 20(1):35-51.

Chu, C.Y. Cyrus. 1993. ‘Oscillatory vs. Stationary Enforcement of Law’. International Review of Law and Economics 13(3):303-315.

Chu, C.Y. Cyrus, and Neville Jiang. 1993. ‘Are Fines More Efficient than Imprisonment?’. Journal of Public Economics 51(3):391-413.

Chu, C. Y. Cyrus, Sheng-cheng Hu, and Ting-yuan Huang. 2000. ‘Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely’. International Review of Law and Economics 20(1):127-140.

Cloninger, Dale O. 1992. ‘Capital Punishment and Deterrence: a Portfolio Approach’. Applied Economics 24(6):635-645.

Clotfelter, Charles T. 1977. ‘Public Services, Private Substitutes, and the Demand for Protection Against Crime’. American Economic Review 67(5):867-877.

Cohen, Mark A. 2000. ‘Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Crime and Justice’. Criminal Justice 4:263-315.

Craig, Steven G. 1987. ‘The Deterrent Impact of Police: An Examination of a Locally Provided Public Service’. Journal of Urban Economics 21(3):298-311.

Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee. 1986. ‘Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2(2):279-303.

Daniel, Kermit, and John R. Lott, Jr. 1995. ‘Should Criminal Penalties Include Third-Party Avoidance Costs?’. Journal of Legal Studies 24(2):523-534.

Davis, Michael L. 1988. ‘Time and Punishment: An Intertemporal Model of Crime’. Journal of Political Economy 96(2):383-390.

Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, Paul H. Rubin, and Joanna M. Shepherd. 2003. ‘Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data’. American Law and Economics Review 5(2):344-376.

Dharmapala, Dhammika, and Nuno Garoupa. 2004. ‘Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis’. American Law and Economics Review 6(1):185-207.

Dickens, William T. 1986. ‘Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with a Psychological Twist’. Journal of Public Economics 30(1):97-107.

Dittmann, Ingolf. 1999. ‘Crime and Punishment: On the Optimality of Imprisonment although Fines are Feasible’. Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/1.

Echazu, Luciana, and Nuno Garoupa 2010. ‘Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort’. American Law and Economics Review 12(1):162-180.

Ehrlich, Isaac. 1972. ‘The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement’. Journal of Legal Studies 1(2):259-276.

Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation’. Journal of Political Economy 81(3):521-565.

Ehrlich, Isaac. 1975. ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’. American Economic Review 65(3):397-417.

Ehrlich, Isaac. 1981. ‘On the Usefulness of Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence’. American Economic Review 71(3):307-322.

Ehrlich, Isaac. 1982. ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws and the Concept of Justice: A Positive Analysis’. International Review of Law and Economics 2(1):3-27.

Ehrlich, Issac. 1996. ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1):43-67.

Ehrlich, Isaac, and Joel C. Gibbons. 1977. ‘On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence’. Journal of Legal Studies 6(1):35-50.

Eide, Erling. 2000. ‘8100 Economics of Criminal Behavior’. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (Eds.). 5:345-389. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Fiorentini, Gianluca. 2000. ‘8400 Organized Crime and Illegal Markets’. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (Eds.). 5:434-459. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Fischel, Daniel R., and Alan O. Sykes. 1996. ‘Corporate Crime’. Journal of Legal Studies 25(2):319-349.

Friedman, David, and William Sjostrom. 1993. ‘Hanged for a Sheep – The Economics of Marginal Deterrence’. Journal of Legal Studies 22(2):345-366.

Garoupa, Nuno. 1998. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals’. Economica 65(260):479-490.

Garoupa, Nuno. 2000. ‘The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement’. Economic Inquiry 38(2):278-288.

Garoupa, Nuno. 2007. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization’. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63(3):461-474.

Garoupa, Nuno, and Mohamed Jellal. 2004. ‘Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20(1):192-206.

Garoupa, Nuno, and Daniel M. Klerman. 2002. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government’. American Law and Economics Review 4(1):116-140.

Garoupa, Nuno, and Daniel M. Klerman. 2010. ‘Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History’. Review of Law and Economics 6(1):75-96.

Garoupa, Nuno, and Jonathan Klick. 2008. ‘Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule’. Review of Law and Economics 4(1):407-418.

Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce. 1999. ‘Why Is There More Crime in Cities?’, 107 Journal of Political Economy, S225-S258.

Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce. 2000. ‘The Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence, Incapacitation and Vengeance’, NBER Working Paper No. W7676.

Graetz, Michael J., Jennifer F. Reinganum, and Louis L.Wilde. 1986. ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2(1):1-32.

Grossman, Gene M. and Michael L. Katz. 1983. ‘Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare’. American Economic Review 73(4):749-757.

Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena. 1989. ‘Functional Substitution Among Crimes: Some Evidence’. Eastern Economic Journal 15(2):129-140.

Hylton, Keith N. 1996. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution’. RAND Journal of Economics 27(1):197-206.

Innes, Robert. 1999. ‘Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement’. Journal of Public Economics 72(3):379-393.

Jellal, Mohamed and Nuno Garoupa. 1999. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information’. Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Papers No 401.

Kan, Steven S. 1996. ‘Corporal Punishments and Optimal Incapacitation’. Journal of Legal Studies 25(1):121-130.

Kaplow, Louis. 1990. ‘Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6(1):93-128.

Kaplow, Louis. 1992. ‘The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable’. International Review of Law and Economics 12(1):3-11.

Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. 1994a. ‘Accuracy in the Determination of Liability’. Journal of Law and Economics 37(1):1-15.

Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. 1994b. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior’. Journal of Political Economy 102(3):583-606.

Kenkel, Donald S. 1993. ‘Drinking, Driving, and Deterrence: The Effectiveness and Social Costs of Alternative Policies’. Journal of Law and Economics 36(2):877-913.

Kessler, Daniel, and Steven D. Levitt. 1999. ‘Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation’. Journal of Law and Economics 42(S1):343-363.

Kobayashi, Bruce H., and John R. Lott, Jr. 1992. ‘Low-Probability-High-Penalty Enforcement Strategies and the Efficient Operation of the Plea-Bargaining System’. International Review of Law and Economics 12(1):69-77.

Kobayashi, Bruce H., and John R. Lott, Jr. 1996. ‘In Defense of Criminal Defense Expenditures and Plea Bargaining’. International Review of Law and Economics 16(4):397-416.

Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 1975. ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’. Journal of Legal Studies 4(1):1-46.

Lando, Henrik, and Steven Shavell. 2004. ‘The Advantage of Focusing Law Enforcement Effort’. International Review of Law and Economics 24(2): 209-218.

Leung, Siu Fai. 1995. ‘Dynamic Deterrence Theory’. Economica 62(245):65-87.

Levitt, Steven D. 1996. ‘The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence From Prison Overcrowding Litigation’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(2):319-351.

Levitt, Steven D. 1997. ‘Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of Prison Sentences Instead of Fines’. International Review of Law and Economics 17(2):179-192.

Levitt, Steven D. 1998. ‘Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?’. Economic Inquiry 36(3):353-372.

Lewin, Jeff L., and William N. Trumbull. 1990. ‘The Social Value of Crime?’. International Review of Law and Economics 10(3):271-284.

Lott, John R., Jr. 1987. ‘Should the Wealthy be Able to “Buy Justice”?’. Journal of Political Economy 95(6):1307-1316.

Lott, John R., Jr. 1992a. ‘An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual’s Reputation’. Journal of Legal Studies 21(1):159-187.

Lott, John R., Jr. 1992b. ‘Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?’. Economic Inquiry 30(4):583-608.

Lott, John R., Jr. 2000. ‘8600 Corporate Criminal Liability’. In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, B. Bouckaert, and G. De Geest (Eds.). 5:492-501. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Lott, John R., Jr., and Russell D. Roberts. 1989. ‘Why Comply: One-Sided Enforcement of Price Controls and Victimless Crime Laws’. Journal of Legal Studies 18(2):403-414.

Malik, Arun S. 1990. ‘Avoidance, Screening, and Optimum Enforcement’. RAND Journal of Economics 21(3):341-353.

Meade, Jose, and Joel Waldfogel. 1998. ‘Do Sentencing Guidelines Raise the Cost of Punishment?’. NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 6361.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Ivan P. L. Png. 1992. ‘Monitoring vis-à-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law’. American Economic Review 82(3):556-565.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Ivan P. L. Png. 1994. ‘Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law’. Journal of Political Economy 102(5):1039-1066.

Mookherjee, Dilip, and Ivan P. L. Png. 1995. ‘Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should they be Compensated?’. Economic Journal 105(428):145-159.

Nash, John. 1991. ‘To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime: The Theory and Statistical Estimation of a Multi-Period Optimal Deterrence Model’. International Review of Law and Economics 11(1):101-110.

Opp, Karl Dieter. 1989. ‘The Economics of Crime and the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour: A Theoretical Confrontation of Basic Propositions’. Kyklos 42(3):405-430.

Pallage, Stephane and Dominique Demougin. 2003. ‘Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones’. International Review of Law and Economics 23(3):309-321.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell. 1980. ‘Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines’. Journal of Legal Studies 9(1):105-127.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell. 2006. ‘The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth Is Unobservable’. Journal of Public Economics 90(4-5):823-835.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1988. ‘The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials’. International Review of Law and Economics 8(1):109-116.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 1991. ‘A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders’. Journal of Public Economics 46(3):291-306.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1979. ‘The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines’. American Economic Review 69(5):880-891.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1984. ‘The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment’. Journal of Public Economics 24(1):89-99.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1992. ‘Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines’. Journal of Law and Economics 35(1):133-148.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1993. ‘Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given Existence of Corporate Liability?’. International Review of Law and Economics 13(3):239-257.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1994. ‘Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 10(2):427-37.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1998. ‘On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence’. International Review of Law and Economics 18(3):305-324.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 1999. ‘On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence’. Journal of Legal Studies 28(1):1-16.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 2000. ‘The Fairness of Sanctions: Some Implications for Optimal Enforcement Policy’. American Law and Economics Review 2(2):223-37.

Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell. 2001. ‘Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement’. Journal of Public Economics 81(1):1-24.

Posner, Richard A. 1980. ‘Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment’. Journal of Legal Studies 9(1):71-92.

Raphael, Steven, and Rudolf Winter-Ember. 2001. ‘Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime’. Journal of Law and Economics 44(1):259-283.

Rasmusen, Eric. 1996. ‘Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality’. Journal of Law and Economics 39(2):519-543.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1993. ‘The Law Enforcement Process and Criminal Choice’. International Review of Law and Economics 13(2):115-134.

Sah, Raaj K. 1991. ‘Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime’. Journal of Political Economy 99(6):1272-1295.

Shavell, Steven. 1985. ‘Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent’. Columbia Law Review 85(6):1232-1262.

Shavell, Steven. 1987. ‘The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent’. American Economic Review 77(4):584-592.

Shavell, Steven. 1990. ‘Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts’. Journal of Legal Studies 19(2):435-466.

Shavell, Steven. 1991. ‘Specific versus General Enforcement of Law’. Journal of Political Economy 99(5):1088-1108.

Shavell, Steven. 1992. ‘A Note on Marginal Deterrence’. International Review of Law and Economics 12(3):345-355.

Shavell, Steven. 1993. ‘The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement’. Journal of Law and Economics 36(1):255-287.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. ‘Corruption’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3):599-617.

Tauchen, Helen, Ann Dryden Witte, and Harriet Griesinger. 1994. ‘Criminal Deterrence: Revisiting the Issue with a Birth Cohort’. Review of Economics and Statistics 76(3):399-412.

Viscusi, W. Kip. 1986. ‘The Risks and Rewards of Criminal Activity: A Comprehensive Test of Criminal Deterrence’. Journal of Labor Economics 4(3):317-340.

Waldfogel, Joel. 1993. ‘Criminal Sentences as Endogenous Taxes: Are They “Just” or “Efficient”?’. Journal of Law and Economics 36(1):139-151.

Wilde Louis L. 1992. ‘Criminal Choice, Nonmonetary Sanctions, and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis’. International Review of Law and Economics 12(3):333-344.

Witte, Ann Dryden and Robert Witt. 2001. ‘What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention’. NBER Working Paper No. 8204.