Учебный год 22-23 / The Emergence of Modern American Contract Doctrine
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CONCLUSION: UNDERMINING THE METAPHYSICS OF CONTRACT
on an understanding instilled in every student of contract since the late nineteenth century, we have all been trained to read the history of contract backward, as the often misunderstood but finally perfected art of enforcing promises. It has become nearly impossible to read the history of contract without initially conceiving of contract as an issue of enforcing promises, whence the necessity of dividing promises into the enforceable and unenforceable kinds. In this sense, the classical thinkers established a metaphysics of contract, reasoning that earlier conceptions of contract were primitive, unperfected, incomplete, but that the real basis of contract was eternal.
My claim in this book has not been that all such views are based on a misunderstanding. Indeed, as much as it is a mode of economic regulation, contract is a conception, an intellectual construct: it is primarily what people believe it to be. The popular belief is not wrong. But there may be better beliefs available, if someone has the impulse to look. This book does not seek to establish an alternative metaphysics of contract. It does, however, suggest that it would be more useful to think about contract as a framework for cooperation, the central element of which is the set of relationships whose terms are potentially regulated by the state.18 This conception is both a better account of judicial practice, and a way to improve on that practice by ridding it of those commitments that have the effect of limiting contract’s fairness-promoting, or redistributive potential.19 Contract is a conception, and thus, it may be reconceived, or reimagined. A prod to our imagination, and a reminder that the current conception is neither timeless nor transcendent, is the fact that only a century and a half ago, contract was conceived of quite differently. The transformation of contract is tied to complex economic and social changes, but its technical doctrinal manifestation is visible in the work of classical theorists. My claim here has been that what classical
Gilmore, The Death of Contract 24 (2d ed. 1995). Gilmore’s history and theory have become objects of routine disparagement, but Gilmore’s first calling was literary criticism, and his insights into the Nietzschean mode by which the classical interpretation of contract became dominant, and its violence in ousting previously popular interpretations of contract, remain salient. By subjecting the cases to a rereading, and by emphasizing how controversial the classical interpretations and classifications of the cases were when they appeared, Gilmore reminds us of the creative power of classical theorizing.
18. One of the important parts of such a view of contract would be some account of how potential regulation works, not only when the potential is exercised, but also when it remains in the shadows, since the refusal of the state to exercise power over a given relationship allows whoever wields power within the relationship to violate the relationship’s norms with impunity.
19. At least one scholar has made the case that the best reading of the history of contract should place the fairness of distribution at its center, while retaining the focus on promise enforcement. See James Gordley, “Enforcing Promises,” 83 Cal. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1995).
CONCLUSION: UNDERMINING THE METAPHYSICS OF CONTRACT |
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contract theory undertook piecemeal, it achieved wholesale. The rhetorical framework that made enforcing promises into the centerpiece of contract retains its power today, and perhaps is the major factor limiting contract’s transformative potential.
Index
Acquisitive individuality, 100, 147, 150 Addison, C.G., 33n, 38f
Adequacy of consideration, 29, 77, 140n, 233 Agency, 5n, 22f, 42, 44, 70n, 213n. See also
Contract types
Albers v. Lamson, 123f, 151n Anson, William, R., 39n, 41n, 202n Anticipatory breach of contract, 107
Antigambling discourse, 100–104, 119ff, 124, 139ff, 148, 159
Antigaming statutes, 97n, 108–21 passim Arnold, Thurman, 225f
Ashton, John, 126–30 passim
Assignment of rights, 11, 131–45, 157, 185f Assumpsit, 3n, 25–29 passim, 41, 201n Atiyah, P.S., 2, 43n
Autonomy, 4f, 73, 80, 86, 183, 192–96 passim, 229–34 passim
Bailment, 22–28 passim, 33n, 40–44 passim, 70n, 202n, 229
Baker, Tom, 101n, 104, 130n Ballantine, Henry Winthrop, 33f
Bank deposit gifts, 48–50. See also Joint accounts; Survivorship
Banker’s Reserve Life v. Matthews, 144f Barnett, Randy, 191f, 199f, 224n
Bank of Ettrick v. Emberson, 115n Beale, Joseph Henry, 27, 33n, 40ff
Beaver v. Beaver, 57f Benjamin, Walter, 152 Bensel, Richard Franklin, 4n
Benson, Peter, 2n, 72n, 192f, 224n Bernstein, Lisa, 193f
Bishop, Joel Prentiss, 215f
Bloom, Harold, 227, 235
Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 121f, 150n, 157n
Bourdieu, Pierre, 92f
Bradford v. Whitcomb, 208n, 214n Breach of contract, 28f, 105, 107 Bucket shops, 122
Bump v. Pratt, 51n
Burton, Steven J., 172ff, 178f, 183n, 185n, 205n
Calculation, 3–6, 10, 12, 17, 22, 44, 92–94 128f, 148f, 228f, 232ff. See also under Individual identity
Capitalism, 92n, 151, 153, 195, 221f, 227–31 passim. See also Market consciousness
Cardozo, Benjamin N., 72f
Carns v. Bassick, 212f Chamberlain v. Butler, 143ff
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Charny, David, 47n, 165n, 167n, 171f, 191n, 193f, 220n
Chicago Board of Trade, 105–9 passim, 118, 121f
City of Chicago v. Sexton, 209
Classical legal thought, 6–11 passim, 15–38 passim, 42ff, 68–75 passim, 80, 82n, 86–93 passim, 108, 164, 189–96 passim, 200–204 passim, 215–25 passim, 229–36 passim
Cohen v. Rothschild, 116 Cohen, Felix S., 72f Coleman, Jules L., 171f, 174n Commodification, 78–82, 90n
Community, 36n, 102f, 117, 124, 127, 148, 151n, 171n, 180f, 198, 218
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance v. Schaefer, 102n, 129n, 143n
Consent, 5, 36–41 passim, 172, 185f, 190–96 passim, 199–202, 218f, 223
Consideration, preclassical functions of, 23–32 Consolidation, 149
Construction, 24n, 62, 154, 165–72 passim, 178f, 194–97, 203, 206, 214, 219f. See also interpretation; Suppletive rules
Contract types, 5f, 20f, 170n, 202n, 204n, 217, 229. See also Bailment; Agency
Coppage v. Kansas, 197f
Corbin, Arthur L., 33–35; 39n, 41n, 71n, 81n, 166–70, 191n, 219n
Corporate form, 93, 228–33 passim
Cothran v. Ellis, 119f Counselman v. Reichart, 112f, 115 Cover, Robert, M., 64n
Creamer v. Metropolitan Securities, 211f
Critical legal studies, 90n, 99n, 196n, 219n. See also Kennedy, Duncan
Culture, 1–6 passim, 11, 47, 84, 93, 98f, 102, 124, 146f, 151ff, 158, 163f, 219–25 passim, 231, 234
Damages for breach of contract, 28; 70ff, 76, 105, 107
Dawson, John P., 16n, 35n, 170n
Day v. Cross, 208n
Declaration of trust, 46. See also Formalities Default rules, 165f, 170–76 passim, 192f, 203,
223. See also Suppletive rules; Construction Delivery of gifts, 45–59 passim, 64, 68, 74
Dennin v. Hilton, 65n Derivatives, 11, 99, 156f
Dodge v. Kimball, 214
Dunn v. Houghton, 51n, 53n, 60ff Duress, 18, 76f, 111, 179, 191n, 223n
Economic analysis of law, 17, 76n, 79n, 157n, 173–175, 183, 190, 192
Embrey v. Jemison, 111f, 123n English v. Fischer, 184n
Epstein, Richard, 93n, 194n, 199n
Evidence, 39, 49, 53–56, 93, 112–17 passim; of intent to make gift, 49, 52, 56–59
Expectation damages, 105, 107 Expertise, 128, 157
Fabian, Ann, 102f, 120, 148n, 159n
Fairness in exchange, 45, 76f, 91n, 164–71 passim, 175, 179–83 passim, 190, 195f, 206f, 211f, 218, 223, 236. See also Unconscionability
Farnsworth, E. Allen, 1f, 78n, 80n, 111n, 168n, 170n, 177–79, 184n, 204f
Finnie v. Walker, 144f Fisher v. Ludwig, 47n, 49n
Formalism, 11, 164, 188–97 passim, 204, 216 Formalities, 46–49, 53n, 57–59, 73–75, 78 Fraud, 23n, 28, 53–58 passim, 111, 126f, 179 Free labor ideology, 84f, 232, 234
Free market, 3, 12, 223
Freedom of contract, 3n, 22, 84f, 89, 99, 146, 174n, 188ff, 195–200 passim, 221
Fried, Charles, 2n, 166n, 181, 183n, 193 Fuller, Lon L., 19n, 29n, 72–81 passim, 90f,
111n, 200n, 221n
Functionalism, 73f, 78–83 passim, 109n
Gambling, 97–130 passim, 134–59 passim Gift economy, 84–92 passim
Gilmore, Grant, 35n, 201n, 235f
Good faith, 122f, 143–47, 164–68 passim, 175–87, 196, 204–218 passim
Gordley, James, 7n, 77n, 200n, 202n, 204n, 236n
Gordon, Robert, 90n, 159, 170n, 219n Gratuitous bailment, 27, 41, 76n
Gratuitous promise, 18, 34, 76–80 passim, 87 Gratuitous undertakings, 18, 27, 34–40 passim
Grigsby v. Russel, 140f
Gulliver, Ashbel G., 74–78 passim
Hacking, Ian, 100f Halttunen, Karen, 127, 148n
Hirschman, Albert O., 226, 228n Holdsworth, William, 16n, 26n, 30n, 33n,
45n, 49n
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr., 16n, 99n, 119–23 passim, 140f, 150, 155, 157, 191n, 202n, 235n
Horwitz, Morton J., 28n, 73n, 105n, 109n, 111n, 137ff, 200n
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 111n, 200n, Humphreys v. Central Kentucky Ry., 210f Hypothetical bargain, 165–175 passim, 193n,
220n
Ideology, 84f, 89f, 99n, 104n, 222, 232, 234 Illusory promises, 34, 71, 213
Implied obligations, 8, 20–32 passim, 204–218, 230
Incentives, 3n, 47, 81, 107, 109n, 174n, 225 Indefiniteness, 178, 181, 206–13 passim Individual identity, 1, 4, 12, 84–89 passim, 98,
151, 163, 219–25 passim, 229–34 passim; and calculability of the individual, 6, 12, 91–94 passim, 233f. See also Subjectivity (individual subject)
Industrialization, 4, 6, 120, 151, 231, 234 Insurable interest, 102n, 129–48 passim Intent, 37, 39; to make gift, 44–52 passim,
56–67 passim, 75; and wager, 106–24 passim, 135f, 143–46; and incomplete contracts, 166ff, 181, 183, 190, 200–203 passim, 208n, 215f, 220f
Interdependence, 229–34 passim Interpretation, 59f, 64, 75, 115, 164–69, 178,
182, 184, 190–95 passim, 200. See also construction
Irwin v. Williar, 113f
Jamieson v. Wallace, 120f
Joint bank accounts, 52f, 60–63. See also Bank deposit gifts
Keener, William, 42
Kelly v. Beers, 52n
Kennedy, Duncan, 6n, 21n, 74n, 90n, 99n, 196n, 204n, 219n, 221n
Kessler, Friedrich, 188f, 194ff
Kham and Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc., v. First Bank of Whiting 178n, 187n
Kirk v. McCusker, 59f Korobkin, Russell, 172f, 175n
K.M.C. Co., Inc., v. Irving Trust Co., 187 Knight, Frank, 149–53 passim
Labor contract, 20n, 22n, 84f, 197ff, 229–34 passim
Laissez-faire, 197ff
Langdell, Christopher Columbus, 16n, 25f, 30–34 passim, 69n, 72f, 202n, 235n
Lawler v. Murphy, 211n
Law of large numbers, 124f, 149, 234 Lears, T.J. Jackson, 4f
Legal realism, 73, 83, 99n, 168f, 175, 192f, 200n, 219n, 223n
Lippmann, Walter, 231
Liss v. Manuel, 155f
Livingston, James, 4n, 222n, 231n Llewellyn, Karl N., 31, 43n, 76f, 81n, 175,
191n, 204
Lloyd’s Insurance, 126
Lochner v. New York, 189n, 197f Lukacs, Georg, 151f
Luther v. Bash, 212
Macneil, Ian R., 19n, 97n, 165n, 170n, 181n, 192n, 196n, 233
Mahon v. Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 54f
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Maine, Henry, 42, 86
Mainstee Iron Works Co. v. Shores Lumber Co., 211n
Mandatory rules, 173, 186n, 195, 199. See also Default rules
Manhattan Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 137–40 Market consciousness, 98, 149–52, 228 Market morality, 215, 218
Martin v. Kippitz-Melcher Brewing Co., 212n McCoy’s Adm’r v. McCoy, 49f, 57n McCurdy, Charles, 85n, 197, 199n
McRae v. Warmack, 145f Mechem, Philip, 74
Miller v. Sincere, 108, 113n
Modernity, 11, 15n, 150ff, 159, 196; and gambling, 118–24 passim, 149–152, 156, 159
Money, 148–52 passim, 225, 228, 232f Moral hazard, 103f, 130–34 passim, 141 Morality, 101, 104n, 120, 140, 167, 181f. See
also Market consciousness; Market morality Mutuality of obligation, 34, 71, 209, 212. See
also Ballantine, Henry Winthrop
Negotiability, 138f
Neoformalism, 193–96. See also Formalism New York Life Insurance Company (NYLIC),
128f, 148n
Newell, Douglas K., 180n, 204n Novak, William, 197ff, 226n
Objective theory of contract, 56f, 110–13 passim, 200f
Orth, John V., 19f, 22n
Parol evidence rule, 190, 193
Parsons, Theophilus, 20–24 passim, 28, 33, 39n, 70f, 202ff, 230
Partridge v. Kearns, 51
Past consideration, 24ff, 72n, 230, 233 Paternalism, 121, 157, 184n, 219n, 226
Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co. of New York, 211n Patterson, Edwin, 117, 119, 131n, 134n,
144–150 passim
Phipard v. Phipard, 50n, 55n
Podmore v. South Brooklyn Savings Institution, 54f
Podmore v. Dime Sav. Bank of Williamsburgh, 56n
Polanyi, Karl, 233
Policy, 50n, 58f, 69–73 passim, 77f, 97–102, 117–24, 131, 138–43, 147–54 passim, 220
Pollock, Frederick, 36–39, 215, 235n Posner, Richard, 78–80, 97n, 155, 173n Pound, Roscoe, 5f, 33n, 45f, 73, 81n, 221f Pratt, Walter F., 195n, 215n
Private lawmaking, 89, 193, 197–202 passim, 218, 221
Private ordering, 3, 10, 164, 219–222 passim, 235. See also Free market
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Privity of contract, 24, 29–32
Probability, 101, 104f, 128, 135f, 149f, 153–59 passim, 234
Professionalism, 129, 148, 150
Promise-based definition of contract, 2, 16–19, 30, 36–39 passim, 235
Promissory estoppel, 70f, 76n, 89, 201n
Quasi-contract, 24–32 passim, 40–43 passim, 73, 167n, 201n, 205n, 218
Rationalization, 4, 17, 82, 91, 230, 235; and contract, 7, 10, 42, 111, 172, 229, 234; and individual, 10, 17, 33, 64, 91, 222–27 passim, 232, 234; and exchange, 91, 93, 149f, 156, 228
Regulation, 84–89 passim, 99, 106, 123f, 157, 197f, 222ff, 236
Relation-based conception of contract, 5–7, 19ff, 32, 41f, 91, 191f, 196, 229. See also Contract types
Reliance damages, 70ff, 76 Religion, 4, 101f, 120, 140, 150
Restatement of Contracts (1932), 29n, 39n, 69ff, 235n
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981), 71f, 168f, 176f, 183n
Rhetoric, 17, 19, 82, 86–91 passim, 100, 164, 183, 202, 218n, 224ff; judicial uses of, 11, 64–67, 98ff, 114–24 passim, 139f, 144n, 151–58 passim, 164, 215–20 passim
Ridden v. Thrall, 48f
Risk allocation, 11, 97f, 155–58 passim, 182f
Rix v. Hunt, 65n Rockefeller, John D., 231
Rylander v. Allen, 134ff
Salzman v. Boeing, 121 Schlee v. Guckenheimer, 118 Schneider v. Turner, 119n Schultz, M. Denise, 158n
Scientific management, 231–34 passim Scott, Robert, 168n, 171n, 183n, 190n, 193 Self-ownership, 84f, 232, 234
Self-reliance, 103f
Simmel, Georg, 228, 233n, 235
Slawson, David, 170n, 189, 195f
Sociological jurisprudence, 73, 78, 88–92 passim, 102, 203n, 222, 232. See also Pound, Roscoe
Specialization, 106, 148ff, 157
St. John v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co., 142
Status, 19–22 passim, 32, 42, 84–89 passim, 229
Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 142f Stone, F. Harlan, 45n
Subjective theory of contract, 110–13 Subjectivity (individual subject), 3–7 passim,
100f, 152, 222. See also Individual identity Sumner, William Graham, 229n
Suppletive rules, 165–76 passim, 193, 204, 206, 219. See also Default rules
Surety, 24, 44 Survivorship, 52f, 60
Taylor Equipment v. John Deere, 186 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 231
The Common Law, 5n, 15–22 passim, 29n, 41– 45 passim, 106, 110n, 119, 155, 193, 200n
Thomas’ Adm’r v. Lewis, 66n Thomas v. Fuller, 65n, 76f
Third party beneficiaries, 29f, 69f, 133f Tilson, Catherine, 74f
Tilford v. Bank for Sav., 54n, 56n Time, see Modernity
Tontine policy, 101f Trebilcock, Michael, 3n, 174n
Tymshare Inc. v. Covell, 184n
Uncertainty, 11, 98, 100, 135–38 passim, 149–59 passim, 183, 206
Unconscionability, 28, 177ff, 195, 230 Uniform Commercial Code, 71f, 168n, 176–79,
186n, 193, 204f
US v. Peck, 213
Viatical settlement, 99, 156ff
Warnock v. Davis, 133, 145f Weber, Max, 4, 92, 227n, 233n
Welfare, 73, 80, 119, 130n, 167, 184n, 198, 223
Whalen v. Milholland, 53n, 62f Widiss, Alan, 130f
Wiebe Robert, H., 6f
Will (or will theory), 5f, 90n, 200–204 passim Williams, Glanville, 166n, 168n
Williams v. Chicago Santa Fe Ry., 206f Williston, Samuel, 16n, 26–39 passim, 49n,
70f, 77n, 89f, 97n, 106–16 passim, 129n, 137f, 199–204 passim, 222n, 235n
Witt, John Fabian, 84f, 230ff
Young v. Young, 57n
Zelizer, Viviana, 101f, 128–32 passim, 148n